Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop - Army Electronic Publications ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Chapter 4 FOCUS 4-4. Security missions focus on the elements to be protected that may include the higher unit, fires sections, critical assets, the population, etc. The focus of the security operation allows the troop commander to determine the specific critical tasks, and the priority, that need to be accomplished. Security operations are terrain or friendly unit-oriented. The focus should be what the troop is to protect and why, or what the expected results of the security are. Examples of focus include the following: Local society or population to protect them from the threat/enemy. Infrastructure. Terrain. 4-5. Named areas of interest (NAIs) provide a method of focusing the troop effort; they link most likely threat activities to terrain where those activities may occur. Using the NAIs as a guide, DRT PLs can position their assets to provide the most effective observation; for example, they can emplace OPs to observe primary threat avenues of approach and employ ground-based sensors for secondary approaches. TEMPO 4-6. The tempo of the DRT conducting security missions allows the troop commander to establish associated time requirements that drive certain aspects of the security plan, including OPs, SUAS rotation, and augmentation assets necessary to execute the mission. Tempo can relate to depth, especially in screening missions where time is needed to properly deploy assets into position to achieve the required depth. Tempo may dictate whether DRT units employ short-, long-, or extended-duration OPs. ENGAGEMENT/DISPLACEMENT CRITERIA 4-7. Engagement criteria establish the conditions under which the troop is expected to engage the enemy. The DRT troop commander’s understanding of the squadron commander’s expectations, coupled with his knowledge of the enemy’s most likely COA, allow him to determine the troop’s engagement criteria. 4-8. Displacement to subsequent positions is normally event-driven. The approach of an identified and specified threat element, detection by a threat force, relief by a friendly unit, or movement of the protected force may dictate the displacement of the DRT. Collapsing of a screen, executed well by the DRT platoons, provides security and maintains contact for the troop and squadron as it displaces. The protected force commander normally does not place time requirements on the duration of a screen unless the intent is to provide a higher level of security to the protected force or to provide a tentative time frame for subordinate unit planning. TROOP’S ROLE IN SECURITY 4-9. The DRT performs security missions to provide the protected unit with early and accurate warning. This prevents the IBCT main body from being surprised and preserves the combat power of the unit for decisive employment. Critical information includes the size, composition, location, direction, and rate of movement of the enemy. Terrain information focuses on obstacles, avenues of approach, and key terrain features that affect movement. The intent is to provide information that gives the commander reaction time and the maneuver space necessary to effectively fight the enemy. 4-10. Current trends stress the likelihood of conducting operations in noncontiguous, extended AOs, possibly creating significant gaps between IBCT units. Despite continual evolution of sophisticated sensors and collection assets, SA will never be perfect. This is true especially in periods of limited visibility or adverse weather. Uncertainty will always be present in the AO. Accordingly, the troop will be prepared to conduct security missions. SURVEILLANCE AND COUNTERRECONNAISSANCE 4-11. Surveillance may be continuous in all security operations. By conducting surveillance, the reconnaissance troop provides information to the commander to prevent surprise, provide reaction time, 4-2 ATTP 3-20.97 16 November 2010
Security Operations and allow him to make decisions for maneuver and fires. The organization, training, and equipment capabilities of the troop allow it to provide continuous security. 4-12. Counterreconnaissance is also a crucial component of security operations. Counterreconnaissance is the sum of all actions taken to defeat enemy reconnaissance efforts. The focus of counterreconnaissance is on denying the enemy any information about friendly operations. It is accomplished by deceiving, defeating, or destroying enemy reconnaissance efforts. SECTION III – FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITY OPERATIONS 4-13. The fundamentals of security operations, which are covered in detail in FM 3-90 and FM 3-20.96, are the following: Provide reaction time and maneuver space. Orient on the force, area, or facility to be protected. Perform continuous reconnaissance. Maintain enemy contact. SECTION IV – FORMS OF SECURITY 4-14. Security operations are categorized in terms of the degree of security provided and the amount of combat power required. The DRT is not organized or equipped to execute much of the security mission by itself. It may, however, participate in some larger squadron security missions as a member of a robust combined arms force. Commanders at all levels must consider METT-TC when employing their units in a security role. The five forms of security operations are screen, guard, cover, area, and local. Route and convoy security mission are subsets of area missions. Table 4-2 shows the comparisons of security missions’ capabilities of the DRT and the motorized troops of the IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron. Table 4-2. DRT security mission profiles Security Missions IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron - Motorized Reconnaissance Troop IBCT Reconnaissance Squadron - DRT Screen F P Area Security R R Local Security F F Route Security F P Convoy Security F R F–Fully capable R–Capable when reinforced P–Capable under permissive METT-TC SCREEN 4-15. A screen is a form of security that provides early warning to the protected force. A screening force is a security element which primarily observes, identifies, and reports information. A screening force only fights in self-protection (see FM 3-90). Although it provides the least amount of protection of any security mission, a screen is appropriate when operations have created extended flanks, when gaps between forces exist and cannot be secured in force, or when early warning is needed over gaps that are not considered critical enough to require security in greater strength. A commander normally assigns reconnaissance units this mission when he needs time to respond to an unexpected enemy attack and cannot afford to commit other forces to the task. 4-16. The DRT can screen the front, flanks, and rear of a stationary force, and to the flanks or rear of a moving force. A screen is established by emplacing a series of OPs, augmented with patrols to ensure continuous surveillance of dead space and avenues of approach. The DRT normally fights only in selfdefense. However, based on the commander’s intent and unit capabilities, the DRT can disrupt, defeat, and destroy threat elements within its capabilities. 16 November 2010 ATTP 3-20.97 4-3
Page 1 and 2:
ATTP 3-20.97 Dismounted Reconnaissa
Page 3 and 4:
Army Tactics Techniques and Procedu
Page 5 and 6:
Contents Purpose ..................
Page 7 and 8:
Contents Detachments ..............
Page 9 and 10:
Preface This Army Tactics, Techniqu
Page 11 and 12:
Chapter 1 Introduction The dismount
Page 13 and 14:
Introduction mission command and co
Page 15 and 16:
Troop headquarters. 2-HMMWVs, with
Page 17 and 18: PLATOON SERGEANT Introduction 1-22.
Page 19 and 20: SUPPLY SERGEANT Introduction 1-30.
Page 21 and 22: Introduction describing the threats
Page 23 and 24: Chapter 2 Command and Control The e
Page 25 and 26: Command and Control resource—comp
Page 27 and 28: Artillery targets (list and overlay
Page 29 and 30: Command and Control Uses a listeni
Page 31 and 32: Command and Control 2-39. Ideally,
Page 33 and 34: Higher Headquarters Mission and Com
Page 35 and 36: Command and Control The local popu
Page 37 and 38: Command and Control mission. Suppor
Page 39 and 40: TACTICAL TRANSMISSIONS Command and
Page 41 and 42: Chapter 3 Reconnaissance Operations
Page 43 and 44: Reconnaissance Operations planning
Page 45 and 46: Engagement criteria. Guidance on a
Page 47 and 48: Capabilities Target acquisition.
Page 49 and 50: Reconnaissance Operations their cap
Page 51 and 52: Reconnaissance Operations Determin
Page 53 and 54: CRITICAL TASKS Figure 3-2. Example
Page 55 and 56: Reconnaissance Operations Major te
Page 57 and 58: Reconnaissance Operations CRITICAL
Page 59 and 60: Terrain and weather considerations,
Page 61 and 62: Reconnaissance Operations squadron/
Page 63 and 64: Figure 3-8. Example of reconnaissan
Page 65 and 66: Reconnaissance Operations Nonhosti
Page 67: Chapter 4 Security Operations Secur
Page 71 and 72: Security Operations Fire support p
Page 73 and 74: Security Operations 4-36. When the
Page 75 and 76: Security Operations Requirements a
Page 77 and 78: Security Operations First techniqu
Page 79 and 80: Security Operations Figure 4-2. Exa
Page 81 and 82: Security Operations effective commu
Page 83 and 84: Security Operations Figure 4-5. Exa
Page 85 and 86: CONVOY SECURITY METHODS Security Op
Page 87 and 88: Chapter 5 Stability Operations Stab
Page 89 and 90: SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE Stability
Page 91 and 92: Looking at the host and not the int
Page 93 and 94: Chapter 6 Other Tactical Operations
Page 95 and 96: Other Tactical Operations commander
Page 97 and 98: PICK-UP ZONE/LANDING ZONE OPERATION
Page 99 and 100: Other Tactical Operations 6-34. Coo
Page 101 and 102: Other Tactical Operations reconnais
Page 103 and 104: 6-65. Additional planning considera
Page 105 and 106: Other Tactical Operations In a rea
Page 107 and 108: Figure 6-2. Rearward passage line O
Page 109 and 110: Other Tactical Operations necessary
Page 111 and 112: Chapter 7 Augmenting Combat Power C
Page 113 and 114: Augmenting Combat Power Plan, dire
Page 115 and 116: CONSIDERATIONS Augmenting Combat Po
Page 117 and 118: Augmenting Combat Power alignment,
Page 119 and 120:
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Augmenting
Page 121 and 122:
AVIATION Augmenting Combat Power T
Page 123 and 124:
NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Page 125 and 126:
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Augmenting
Page 127 and 128:
Table 7-4. Techniques for marking o
Page 129 and 130:
PLANNING Augmenting Combat Power P
Page 131 and 132:
Tentative Plan Augmenting Combat Po
Page 133 and 134:
Augmenting Combat Power enter an ar
Page 135 and 136:
ATTACK/RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS 7-10
Page 137 and 138:
Command and Control Augmenting Comb
Page 139 and 140:
LIMITATIONS Augmenting Combat Power
Page 141 and 142:
Augmenting Combat Power 7-138. Dism
Page 143 and 144:
Augmenting Combat Power augments th
Page 145 and 146:
Augmenting Combat Power Conducting
Page 147 and 148:
DIGITAL/ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS Augmenti
Page 149 and 150:
Chapter 8 Sustainment Sustainment f
Page 151 and 152:
SQUADRON TRAINS Sustainment 8-15. T
Page 153 and 154:
DETACHMENTS Sustainment 8-26. If th
Page 155 and 156:
Sustainment which are incorporated
Page 157 and 158:
Coordinate for escort vehicles. Co
Page 159 and 160:
EMERGENCY RESUPPLY Figure 8-3. Exam
Page 161 and 162:
Sustainment 8-67. In using aerial r
Page 163 and 164:
CASUALTY RESPONSE PERSONNEL Sustain
Page 165 and 166:
Sustainment two aid stations, coord
Page 167 and 168:
Table 8-2. Nine-line air evacuation
Page 169 and 170:
Glossary Acronym Definition A ACA a
Page 171 and 172:
METT-TC MICO MISO MOPP MRE Glossary
Page 173 and 174:
SOURCES USED References These are t
Page 175 and 176:
A actions on contact, 3-19, 3-25, 4
Page 177 and 178:
in reconnaissance operations, 3-11,
Page 179 and 180:
By order of the Secretary of the Ar
Page 181 and 182:
This page intentionally left blank.
Page 184:
PIN: 100536-000
show all

Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop - Army Electronic Publications ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?