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Chapter 1 physical environment, the information environment, and enemy, friendly, and neutral systems relevant to a specific operation (FM 3-0). 1-36. The OE includes physical areas, the information that shapes the OE as well as enemy, adversary, friendly, and neutral systems relevant to that joint operation. The OE for each campaign or major operation is different, and it evolves as each campaign or operation progresses. Army forces use operational variables to understand and analyze the broad environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables to focus analysis on specific elements of the environment that apply to their mission. PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 1-37. The physical environment consists of the air, land, sea, and space within the operational area. This environment is a key component in any military operation. The following factors affect the physical environment: Manmade structures, particularly urban areas. Climate and weather. Topography. Hydrology. Natural resources. Biological features and hazards. Other environmental conditions. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT 1-38. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. Throughout history, armies have operated in the information environment, using it for decision making and SU. In the information environment, the U.S. Army constantly strives to attain and maintain information superiority. “Information superiority” is the advantage gained from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. Success in the physical environment does not guarantee success in the information environment. Company leadership must plan and direct operations to establish and maintain information superiority. MISSION VARIABLES 1-39. At the operational level (corps and joint task force), an OE is evaluated by the operational variables of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT). Mission variables are those aspects of the OE that directly affect a mission. Leaders use the mission variables to synthesize tactical level information with local knowledge about conditions relevant to their mission. Upon receipt of a warning order (WARNO) or mission, leaders begin their initial mission analysis and start to visualize their desired end state. The categories of relevant information commanders use for mission analysis at the tactical level are the mission variables of METT-TC which are: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations. Commanders and leaders view all the factors of METT-TC in terms of their impact on mission accomplishment. (For more information on the PMESII-PT variables, see FM 3-0.) 1-40. United States forces are currently engaged in, and will continue to be engaged in, a period of protracted confrontation among states, non-state, and individual actors increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. To be effective, the Soldier must understand the OE that shapes the conflict. THREAT 1-41. Threats are nation-states, organizations, people, groups, conditions, or natural phenomena able to damage or destroy life, vital resources, or institutions. Threats may be described through a range of four major categories or challenges: traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. While helpful in 1-10 ATTP 3-20.97 16 November 2010
Introduction describing the threats the Army is likely to face, adversaries may use any or all of these challenges in combination to achieve the desired effect against the U.S. A good example of a threat that employs all four categories is North Korea: it has large conventional and irregular forces, is a nuclear threat, has been linked to clandestine arms, and exports drugs. The four major categories of threats are traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive. TRADITIONAL 1-42. Traditional threats emerge from states employing recognized military capabilities and forces in understood forms of military competition and conflict. To counter these threats, U.S. forces would employ conventional weapons in primarily offensive and defensive operations. IRREGULAR 1-43. Irregular threats are those posed by an opponent employing unconventional, asymmetric methods and means to counter traditional U.S. advantages. A weaker enemy often uses irregular warfare to exhaust the U.S. collective will through protracted conflict. Irregular warfare includes such means as terrorism, insurgency, and guerrilla warfare. United States forces are currently involved in countering irregular threats. 1-44. Threatening or extremist forces and organizations can be expected to use the environment and rapidly adapt. They will use the media, technology, and their position within a state’s political, military, and social infrastructures to their advantage. Their operations combine conventional, unconventional, irregular, and criminal tactics. They focus on creating conditions of instability, seek to alienate legitimate forces from the population, and employ global networks to expand local operations. The threat employs advanced information operations and is bound by conventional limits on the use of violence. 1-45. Current and future conflicts are much more likely to be fought “among the people” instead of “around the people.” This fundamentally alters the manner in which Soldiers can apply force to achieve success in a conflict. Enemies seek populations to hide in as protection against the proven attack and detection means of U.S. forces. Once secure within the population, these threat forces prepare and conduct attacks against communities and friendly forces while drawing resources from the population. Conflicts often take place in areas in which people are concentrated and require U.S. security dominance to extend across the population. 1-46. Some of the most effective tools that threat forces currently use against U.S. forces are improvised explosive devices (IEDs), mines, car bombs, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and suicide bombers. Infantrymen at all levels must know about these hazards. Additionally, they must know how to identify, avoid, and react to them properly. Newly assigned leaders and Soldiers should read everything they can find on current local threats. In addition, they should learn the unit's policies such as those found in the unit's TACSOP and in locally produced Soldier handbooks and leader guidebooks. CATASTROPHIC 1-47. Catastrophic threats involve the acquisition, possession, and use of weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of related technology has made this threat more likely than in the past. DISRUPTIVE 1-48. Disruptive threats involve an enemy using new technologies that reduce U.S. advantages in key operational domains. 16 November 2010 ATTP 3-20.97 1-11
Page 1 and 2: ATTP 3-20.97 Dismounted Reconnaissa
Page 3 and 4: Army Tactics Techniques and Procedu
Page 5 and 6: Contents Purpose ..................
Page 7 and 8: Contents Detachments ..............
Page 9 and 10: Preface This Army Tactics, Techniqu
Page 11 and 12: Chapter 1 Introduction The dismount
Page 13 and 14: Introduction mission command and co
Page 15 and 16: Troop headquarters. 2-HMMWVs, with
Page 17 and 18: PLATOON SERGEANT Introduction 1-22.
Page 19: SUPPLY SERGEANT Introduction 1-30.
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Page 25 and 26: Command and Control resource—comp
Page 27 and 28: Artillery targets (list and overlay
Page 29 and 30: Command and Control Uses a listeni
Page 31 and 32: Command and Control 2-39. Ideally,
Page 33 and 34: Higher Headquarters Mission and Com
Page 35 and 36: Command and Control The local popu
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Page 43 and 44: Reconnaissance Operations planning
Page 45 and 46: Engagement criteria. Guidance on a
Page 47 and 48: Capabilities Target acquisition.
Page 49 and 50: Reconnaissance Operations their cap
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Page 59 and 60: Terrain and weather considerations,
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Security Operations Fire support p
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Security Operations 4-36. When the
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Security Operations Requirements a
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Security Operations First techniqu
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Security Operations Figure 4-2. Exa
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Security Operations effective commu
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Security Operations Figure 4-5. Exa
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CONVOY SECURITY METHODS Security Op
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Chapter 5 Stability Operations Stab
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SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE Stability
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Looking at the host and not the int
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Chapter 6 Other Tactical Operations
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Other Tactical Operations commander
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PICK-UP ZONE/LANDING ZONE OPERATION
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Other Tactical Operations 6-34. Coo
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Other Tactical Operations reconnais
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6-65. Additional planning considera
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Other Tactical Operations In a rea
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Figure 6-2. Rearward passage line O
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Other Tactical Operations necessary
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Chapter 7 Augmenting Combat Power C
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Augmenting Combat Power Plan, dire
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CONSIDERATIONS Augmenting Combat Po
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Augmenting Combat Power alignment,
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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Augmenting
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AVIATION Augmenting Combat Power T
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NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS
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PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS Augmenting
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Table 7-4. Techniques for marking o
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PLANNING Augmenting Combat Power P
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Tentative Plan Augmenting Combat Po
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Augmenting Combat Power enter an ar
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ATTACK/RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS 7-10
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Command and Control Augmenting Comb
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LIMITATIONS Augmenting Combat Power
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Augmenting Combat Power 7-138. Dism
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Augmenting Combat Power augments th
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Augmenting Combat Power Conducting
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DIGITAL/ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS Augmenti
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Chapter 8 Sustainment Sustainment f
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SQUADRON TRAINS Sustainment 8-15. T
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DETACHMENTS Sustainment 8-26. If th
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Sustainment which are incorporated
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Coordinate for escort vehicles. Co
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EMERGENCY RESUPPLY Figure 8-3. Exam
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Sustainment 8-67. In using aerial r
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CASUALTY RESPONSE PERSONNEL Sustain
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Sustainment two aid stations, coord
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Table 8-2. Nine-line air evacuation
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Glossary Acronym Definition A ACA a
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METT-TC MICO MISO MOPP MRE Glossary
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SOURCES USED References These are t
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A actions on contact, 3-19, 3-25, 4
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in reconnaissance operations, 3-11,
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By order of the Secretary of the Ar
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PIN: 100536-000
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