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Dismounted Reconnaissance Troop - Army Electronic Publications ...

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Chapter 4<br />

First method. The squadron or troop conducts route reconnaissance at irregular intervals to<br />

avoid developing a pattern that the threat may exploit. The troop reconnoiters the route,<br />

including conducting zone reconnaissance to either flank. Organic or attached SUASs or<br />

supporting aviation assets can reconnoiter in advance of ground troops or assist in screening the<br />

flanks. In addition to conducting reconnaissance, troop elements may escort engineers<br />

conducting route clearance, improvement, or maintenance; clearing terrain at potential ambush<br />

sites; and repairing damage caused by threat actions. Augmentation of tactical vehicles will<br />

greatly enhance the execution of this method by the DRT. The motorized troops are better suited<br />

to conduct this method of route security.<br />

Second method. This method entails using an economy of force technique to protect only<br />

critical lengths or locations along the route. The squadron or DRT establishes mutually<br />

supporting combat outposts and provides security between them. Combat outposts are<br />

established at critical choke points to prevent sabotage and to defend against or respond to<br />

attacks to interdict the route between outposts. Based on METT-TC, a DRT can establish one or<br />

two combat outposts, and a squadron can typically establish up to six. The route outside the<br />

reach of the combat outpost is not secured or, normally, patrolled. A squadron provides route<br />

security by combining this method at two locations or critical choke points with route<br />

reconnaissance along the rest of the route using the combination of motorized and dismounted<br />

troops. Combat outposts include FS assets, troop mortars, or howitzer sections capable of<br />

massing fires in support of both the combat outposts and the operations between them. Patrols<br />

are conducted at irregular intervals between the combat outposts based on threat trends and<br />

recent activities. Patrols are organized with sufficient combat power to destroy near ambushes<br />

and to survive initial threat contact from far ambushes. Each combat outpost maintains a reaction<br />

force within their capabilities to respond to threat activity or reinforce patrols.<br />

ROUTE SECURITY PROCEDURES<br />

4-69. Artillery or mortars are deployed into fixed firing positions, moved between position areas for<br />

artillery, or collocated in base camps or combat outposts. However FS assets are controlled and deployed,<br />

some should be available to all reconnaissance elements along the route, with the capability to mass at<br />

critical positions or into areas of most frequent threat activity. Fire plans should consist of priority targets to<br />

support convoy or patrol movement and FPF to support checkpoints or combat outposts. Targets should be<br />

registered whenever possible.<br />

4-70. Patrols are conducted at irregular intervals along the route based on threat trends and recent<br />

activities. Threat forces emplace IEDs, mines, and demolitions; create craters or abatises, or establish<br />

ambushes or roadblocks to interdict or destroy traffic. Air, mounted, and dismounted patrols facilitate<br />

detection of threat forces before emplacing obstacles or execute ambushes. Patrols are organized with<br />

sufficient forces to reconnoiter off-route ambush sites and with enough combat power to survive initial<br />

threat contact. Based on threat capabilities and the patrol’s purpose, reconnaissance patrols should be<br />

augmented with engineers, Infantry, military police, and other assets to increase combat capability. Other<br />

techniques to defeat threat attempts to interdict the route or ambush convoys include the following:<br />

Deceptive “mock” convoys under escort to determine threat reactions. The DRT must be<br />

augmented or cross attached to elements with motorized troops.<br />

Ambushes along known or suspected dismounted approaches to the route.<br />

Registered indirect fires triggered by sensor cues followed by patrols.<br />

Combat patrols conducting reconnaissance by fire at irregular intervals during limited visibility,<br />

prior to sunrise, or in advance of critical convoys to detect and destroy ambushes.<br />

4-71. Although SUASs cannot secure the route, they can assist in observing the route by conducting aerial<br />

reconnaissance, effectively covering large areas in a short time on a continuous basis. Small unmanned<br />

aircraft systems can also assist in providing surveillance depth to the screen securing the route. Ground<br />

sensors can be used in surveillance of key avenues of approach or areas that do not require continuous<br />

surveillance by Scouts. This reduces the manpower and sustainment demands on the DRT’s resources.<br />

4-18 ATTP 3-20.97 16 November 2010

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