05.04.2013 Views

VIGILANCE MANUAL VOLUME III - AP Online

VIGILANCE MANUAL VOLUME III - AP Online

VIGILANCE MANUAL VOLUME III - AP Online

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

DECISION -103<br />

339<br />

It was contended by the appellant before the Supreme Court<br />

that investigation was without the authority of law as investigations<br />

were carried out by an Inspector of Police without the prior permission<br />

of a Magistrate of First Class, that the Inspector of Police, S.P.E.,<br />

had on 12-3-64 merely applied for and obtained from the First Class<br />

Magistrate permission to lay trap and that the permission to investigate<br />

the case was obtained by him only on 21-3-64 but by that time the<br />

entire investigation was over, and that before granting the permission,<br />

the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the question whether there<br />

was any need for granting the same.<br />

The Supreme Court held that the permission given was under<br />

section 5A of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (corresponding to<br />

sec. 17 of P.C.Act, 1988). A permission under that provision is a<br />

permission to investigate the case, laying the trap being a part of the<br />

investigation. An investigation is one and indivisible. Section 5A<br />

does not contemplate two sanctions one for laying the trap and<br />

another for further investigation. Once an order under that provision<br />

is made, that order covers the entire investigation. The Supreme<br />

Court further held that an illegality committed in the course of an<br />

investigation does not affect the competence and jurisdiction of the<br />

Court for trial, and where cognizance of the case has in fact been<br />

taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of<br />

the preceding investigation does not vitiate the result unless<br />

miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.<br />

The appellant also contended that presumption under section<br />

4 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (corresponding to sec. 20 of<br />

P.C. Act, 1988) does not arise unless the prosecution proved that<br />

the amount in question was paid as a bribe and that the word<br />

‘gratification’ can only mean something that is given as a corrupt<br />

reward. The Supreme Court did not agree and further held that the

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!