VIGILANCE MANUAL VOLUME III - AP Online

382 DECISION - 137
The disciplinary authority, however, held that all the charges were
proved and compulsorily retired him from service. On a writ petition
filed by the respondent, the Delhi High Court quashed the order. An
appeal on behalf of the Government was preferred before the
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the High Court in
respect of the first two charges. The appellant urged that the Inquiring
Officer while exonerating the respondent of the first two charges had
erred in rejecting copies of the statement of witnesses which had
been recorded by the Court in the criminal case and if these
statements had been taken into account, the guilt of the respondent
with regard to those charges also would have been proved. The
Supreme Court did not agree with this view and held that these
statements recorded in the Court should not have been admitted in
evidence when those witnesses were not produced for crossexamination
by the respondent in the departmental inquiry.
As regards the third charge, the view taken by the High Court
was that at the time when he accepted the amount of the cheque,
Nand Kumar’s applications for licences were pending not in his
Section but in some other Section and hence it could not be said that
he was likely to have official dealings with him. The Supreme Court
took the view that the words “likely to have official dealings” take
within their ambit the possibility of future dealings also”. A disciplinary
proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard of proof required is
that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable
doubt.” It had come out in evidence that after the applications had
been processed in that Section, they would be sent to the Section
under the respondent’s charge and Nand Kumar knew that the
respondent would be dealing with those applications. The respondent
was atleast expected to know that in due course he would be dealing
with those applications. These circumstances reasonably support
the conclusion that he is guilty of the charge of placing himself under
pecuniary obligation to a person with whom he was likely to have