VIGILANCE MANUAL VOLUME III - AP Online

DECISION - 326
669
(1) of the Probation of Offenders Act. Even during the pendency of
the appeal, the bank terminated the services of the respondent by
order dated 15.4.87 with effect from 10-4-87. The termination is
based solely upon the fact that the respondent has been convicted
by a Criminal Court and since the offence for which he has been
convicted involves moral turpitude, he cannot be continued in
employment in view of the provisions of sec. 10 (1) (b) of the Banking
Regulation Act, 1949 read with para 19.3 (b) of the Bipartite
Settlement.
The Division Bench of the High Court observed that under
sec. 10(1)(b) of the Banking Regulation Act, any and every conviction
by a Criminal Court does not operate as a disqualification for
continuing in service; only the conviction by a criminal Court of an
offence involving moral turpitude operates as such disqualification.
Once it is found that an employee has been convicted of an offence
involving moral turpitude, the employer has no option but to terminate
his service. According to sec. 12 of the probation of Offenders Act,
a person convicted of an offence but dealt with under sec. 4 shall not
suffer disqualification, if any, attaching to a conviction of an offence
under such law. Sec. 10 (1) (b) of the Banking Regulation Act does,
indeed, provide for a disqualification. Though the word
‘disqualification’ is not used therein, it says expressly that a person
convicted by a criminal court of an offence involving moral turpitude
shall not be continued in the employment of a Banking Company.
The Division Bench observed that it is not the heading of the section
or the use of the word ‘disqualification’ that is conclusive; it is the
substance of the provision that matters and a reading of sec. 10(1)(b)
does lead to the conclusion that it does indeed create a disqualification
for continuing in the employment, once a person is convicted of an
offence involving moral turpitude. The Division Bench further
observed that secondly and more importantly, it is necessary to notice
the difference in the language employed in proviso (a) to cl. (2) in
Art. 311 and the language employed in sec. 10(1)(b)(i) of the Banking
Regulation Act. While the constitutional provision says that an enquiry