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the Kelly fraction (which maximizes the long run growth rate) actually makes<br />

the growth rate zero plus the risk free rate; see Ziemba (2003) for more<br />

discussion and the proof. Indeed, this is one explanation for part of the demise<br />

of Long Term Capital Management in 1998 from over betting. Thorp and I are<br />

proponents of the Kelly and fractional Kelly approach and observe that many of<br />

the world's greatest investors like Warren Buffett, John Maynard Keynes, Bill<br />

Benter (in horseracing in Hong Kong) and Thorp himself used such strategies. I<br />

personally consulted for six such individuals who turned zero into hundreds of<br />

millions or even billions (in the case of Jim Simons of Renaissance who made<br />

US$1.4 billion just in 2005). Ziemba (2005) and MacLean and Ziemba (2006)<br />

study many of these investors and Thorp (2006) discusses his use of the Kelly<br />

approach and that of Buffett, who acts as if he was a full Kelly bettor.<br />

Samuelson (see his article in Section 2 of Part V), however, is not a log<br />

utility supporter. His objections are recorded in the conclusion to his article<br />

and in Samuelson (1979). He argues that maximizing the geometric mean rather<br />

than the arithmetic mean maximizes expected utility only for log utility. Indeed<br />

it can be argued that log is the most risky utility function one should ever<br />

consider in the short run, since growth decreases and risk increases for any<br />

convex risk measure with higher than log utility wagers. Donald Hausch and<br />

I did a simulation (see Ziemba and Hausch, 1986), which is reproduced in<br />

MacLean and Ziemba (2006) to understand this better. We take an investor<br />

who bets $1000 with log and half Kelly (-w 1 ) seven hundred times with five<br />

possible wagers with probability of winning 0.19 to 0.57 corresponding to 1-1,<br />

2-1, ..., 5-1 odds with a 14% expected value advantage. The bets are independent.<br />

There are 1000 trials. In 166 of the 1000 trials, the final wealth for log is<br />

greater than 100 times the initial $1000. With half Kelly it is only once this<br />

large. But half Kelly provides higher probability of being ahead, etc. So there is<br />

a growth-security tradeoff. However, it is possible to make 700 independent bets<br />

all with a 14% advantage and still lose 98% of one's wealth. Half Kelly is not<br />

much better. You can still lose 86% of your initial wealth. So the conclusion is<br />

that log is short term risky and wins you the most money long term. The long<br />

term can be very long, however; see Thorp (2006) for some discussion and<br />

calculations. One compromise (see MacLean et al, 2004) is to choose at<br />

discrete intervals the fractional Kelly that would keep you above a wealth path<br />

with high probability. This I have just implemented in a London hedge fund but<br />

with a convex penalty for falling below the path. Log is certainly the most<br />

interesting and controversial utility function for investment. It is rarely taught,<br />

however, in most university investment courses. Despite their original publish-<br />

XXll PREFACE AND BRIEF NOTES TO THE 2006 EDITION

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