A House with Two Rooms - The Advocates for Human Rights

deployment of ecomog
By the time the first battle for Monrovia began, a regional response mechanism to the conflict was
already in process. The government’s rapid loss of control, the rising state of anarchy, and faction
leaders’ control over certain areas 175 compelled Doe to make an appeal for international assistance
in May 1990. 176 In response, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) created
a military intervention force on August 7, 1990, to send to Liberia. 177 Composed of approximately
3,500 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia, the ECOWAS Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG) mission arrived in Monrovia on August 24, 1990. 178 The largest contribution and
greatest number of forces came from Nigeria. 179
Nigeria pursued a dominant role in West Africa on many fronts, including the establishment of
ECOWAS and the maintenance of regional order. 180 For example, Nigeria was the largest supporter of
the ECOMOG mission to Liberia, contributing nearly $50,000,000 and most of the troop support for
the initial deployment of the ECOMOG peacekeeping force. 181 Following the execution of Doe when
Ghanaian General Arnold Quainoo was in charge of the mission, 182 ECOMOG adopted the provision
that a Nigerian would always hold the position of ECOMOG Field Commander. 183 Nigeria’s influence in
Liberia continued to grow even stronger, and by 1994 about 7,000 of the 11,000 ECOMOG troops were
Nigerian. 184
Scholars recognize that Nigeria had several interests in quelling the instability in Liberia. Because it saw
the Liberian conflict as a threat to the region’s economic and military stability, Nigeria sought to restore
order. It also believed that dissidents from Nigeria and neighboring countries had trained in Libya with
Taylor and NPFL forces with the idea that Taylor would support their rebellions in their countries if he
succeeded in Liberia. 185 Nigeria’s perception that intervention was necessary was intensified by the
rebels’ attacks on the Nigerian embassy in Monrovia, the UN mission, and Nigerian and other ECOWAS
citizens, including the August 1990 massacre by the NPFL of hundreds of Nigerian citizens inside the
Nigerian embassy. 186
Finally, Nigeria was motivated to act from a desire to support Doe and to prevent Taylor from
succeeding in his rebellion. 187 The president of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida, who had come
to power through a military coup in 1985, was a friend and ally of Doe. 188 While Nigeria’s motives
for intervening in Liberia are complex, it is also likely that the personal relationship between Gen.
Babangida and Doe played a role. Indeed, Doe made his May 1990 appeal for assistance directly to
Gen. Babangida (and President Eyadema of Togo) rather than to ECOWAS. 189
ECOMOG’s primary purpose was to ensure compliance with peace and ceasefire agreements. 190 A
gap between ECOMOG’s articulated mandate and the actual needs of the situation soon became
apparent. 191 Thus, absent an effective police force and the need for political intervention, ECOMOG,
the regional force, became involved in responsibilities beyond peacekeeping. 192 Throughout its sevenyear
deployment, other responsibilities that ECOMOG assumed included mediation between warring
factions, 193 helping establish the Interim National Government, 194 the implementation of ECOWAS-
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Chapter Seven