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earing on his non-renewal. Second, the board proclaimed that the current superintendent, who<br />

strongly urged Ratliff’s non-renewal, was not the same superintendent as in 1982. Moreover, the<br />

current superintendent was not aware of the speech until the lawsuit arose. Third, there was<br />

evidence of Ratliff’s poor job performance to support the board’s decision.<br />

Ratliff countered that prior to the speech he had never received a negative evaluation. His<br />

written evaluations supported this claim. He also noted that he was persuaded during a 4-hour<br />

session with the board not to resign prior to the 1982-1983 school year. The discrepancy in board<br />

behavior before and after the speech was justification enough for the court to affirm the trial<br />

court’s refusal to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict.<br />

To return to the earlier point about awarding damages based on the intrinsic value of the<br />

right violated, the board argued that this direction was not permissible. Here the board was<br />

correct based on the judgment in Memphis Community School District v. Stachura (1986). The<br />

Supreme Court determined in Stachura (1986) that damages could not be awarded on the<br />

subjective value that a jury assigns to a given right, for it would create an uneven handling in all<br />

cases based on the value the jury placed on the right.<br />

Stachura (1986) was not decided when the jury came in for this case, and the board had<br />

not previously objected to this “intrinsic value” direction from the court. Therefore, the board<br />

had no grounds for appeal on this point because it had not objected previously. Due to the<br />

exceptionality of this case, the court used its discretion in applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 51, where the<br />

preclusion noted above is outlined but so too is the ability of the courts to review items not<br />

appealable to ensure fair practice. In so doing, the court determined that the awarding of<br />

damages based on “intrinsic value” in this case was nearly identical to the events in Stachura<br />

(1986). This award was not permissible.<br />

106

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