ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL ...

Teachers move to principalships where the definite contract exists. The two are symbiotic.
Without the indefinite contract, the foundation for the definite was removed.
Next, Chambers argued that he was never made aware that his definite contract was being
terminated. The court reasoned that any employee made aware of his/her possible indefinite
contract termination would reasonably assume that their current job was at risk. Chambers
further argued that he was never made aware of the charges against him. This point was true, but
only because he did not request them as was required by IND. CODE 20-6.1-4-11(a)(2).
Moreover, Chambers never appeared at any of the hearings he requested where he would have
received written notice of the charges. In short, the board was not at fault for Chambers’ failures
in following the protocol for redress.
Finally, Chambers argued that the board mistakenly applied IND. CODE 20-6.1-4-11 in
terminating his definite contract. The court quickly put this to rest as the written contract that
Chambers signed for his definite contract specifically referenced IND. CODE 20-6.1-4-11 on
numerous occasions in the contract.
Tenn.).
Disposition: The trial court’s decision was affirmed.
Citation: Cooper v. Williamson County Board of Education, 746 S.W.2d 176, (1987
Key Facts: Freeman Cooper was appointed principal of Fairview High School in 1984 by
judgment of the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. After 2 years,
Cooper’s performance waned to the point where on February 7, 1986, Superintendent of Schools
Kenneth L. Fleming brought charges before the board, which voted to dismiss Fleming.
One month later, Cooper filed for judicial review. His review was heard on November 5,
1986, in Chancery Court. The Chancellor stated that he intended to use the court transcripts as
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