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filed a complaint in district court. The board moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).<br />

The court granted the motion explaining that there was no evidence to support D’Angelo’s<br />

claims. This appeal followed.<br />

Issues: (1) Did the court err in granting JMOL on D’Angelo’s free speech retaliation<br />

claim? (2) Did the court err in granting JMOL on D’Angelo’s petition to the government for<br />

redress of grievances? (3) Did the court err in granting JMOL on D’Angelo’s violation to<br />

freedom of association claim?<br />

Holding: The court held that Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) was essential to the resolution of<br />

this case. D’Angelo acted as a school official throughout the charter conversion process, which<br />

precluded his protection under the First Amendment.<br />

Reasoning: Just prior to D’Angelo’s jury trial where the JMOL motion was granted, the<br />

Supreme Court ruled in Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006) where a public employee who spoke in<br />

his/her official capacity was not insulated by the First Amendment. When applied to this case,<br />

the Garcetti standard quickly delineates that D’Angelo did not partake in protected speech. The<br />

record was replete with statements from D’Angelo about his professional obligation to provide<br />

the best educational opportunity for the students of Kathleen High. D’Angelo retroactively<br />

argued that these proclamations stemmed from his moral obligations as a human. This assertion<br />

was unfounded.<br />

Next, D’Angelo claimed that the court erred on his petition to the government for the<br />

redress of grievances. D’Angelo contended that the charter conversion was a petition to the<br />

government for the redress of grievances. The court was not persuaded but proceeded with the<br />

analysis using Garcetti as the guiding light. Yet again, D’Angelo acted in his official capacity;<br />

therefore, his petition--assuming it was one--was not insulated by the First Amendment. Lastly,<br />

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