ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTIONS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL ...

His only response throughout the process from August 14 was a letter submitted on August 23
where Chambers refuted his indefinite contract status stating that he was on a definite contract.
Consequently, on September 20, the board terminated Chambers’ definite and indefinite
contracts.
Chambers filed suit in October asserting that the board had breached his definite contract
in its termination proceedings. He followed this up with a request for summary judgment, which
was partially granted. The board then requested summary judgment on the grounds that it was
required to follow the procedures set forth by the statutory cancellation procedure and that
Chambers had not utilized all his steps for relief prior to seeking a trial. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the board on those counts. Chambers appealed that ruling here.
Issues: (1) Did termination of Chambers’ indefinite contract also terminate his definite
contract? (2) Did the official notice to terminate Chambers’ indefinite contract legally serve as
his notice to terminate his definite contract? (3) Are the policies promulgated in IND. CODE 20-
6.1-4-11 for terminating an indefinite contract the same for terminating an employee with a
definite contract?
Holding: The court held that termination of an indefinite contract undoubtedly implied
the termination of the definite contract. Moreover, the termination of both contracts followed the
same procedural path.
Reasoning: Chambers asserted that cancellation of his indefinite contract did not
automatically cancel his definite contract. The court disagreed based on the mandates set forth in
IND. CODE 20-6.1-4-9.5. The court agreed with the board’s interpretation of this mandate. The
basis for becoming a principal is established as a teacher where the indefinite contract exists.
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