0 INTRODUCTION

1. THE CONCEPT OF NOMINALIZATION
classical view since their idea that language is a “formal system” rests on the assumption
that categories are classical, that is, characterized by distinctive features. Chomsky’s
(1965: 65-66) stance must be understood within the framework of universal grammar.
Therefore, as happens with lexical formatives, categories are selected from a “fixed,
universal set” (cf. Chomsky 1957: 13).
The classical Aristotelian view on categories supports the idea that nouns refer to
objects, whereas verbs refer to actions. However, a quick look at real language calls this
statement into question. For example, an NP such as (5) below contradicts the
Aristotelian categorization since the noun fall does not refer to a particular object but to
an action.
(5) The fall of an apple (Sapir 1921: 117)
Nominalizations fit better in a system such as the ones proposed by Sapir (1921),
Bloomfield (1933) or Malouf (2000). For Sapir (1921: 118), experience shows that
categories grade into each other and, on top of that, they are convertible into each other
(see Section 1.2.3 below), thus proving our capacity to codify the surrounding reality into
quite different formal patterns. Bloomfield (1933: 196) agrees with Sapir on the
impossibility of establishing a consistent scheme of parts of speech, as the boundaries
between word-classes are not always well-defined, usually overlapping and crossing each
other. Other authors (Malouf 2000) consider categories as well-defined, but much more
numerous and less general than in the classical view. Hence, in an attempt to account for
the diversity in real data, two main approaches to categories and categorization have
emerged: the prototype view and the mixed categories view.
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