Notting Hill Carnival Strategic Review - Intelligent Space

agencies and making determinations based solely on public safety grounds. Immediate
discussions should be initiated with the HSE with a view to ascertaining what possible role
and involvement they should have in determining the nature of such an independent agency.
17. We believe that the planning and decision-making process for the Notting Hill Carnival clearly
illustrates the difficulties encountered when responsibility for the event is not and cannot be
attributed to any one single body and where the weakness (or in some cases, absence) of an
event organiser is such that there is a danger that public safety may be compromised. The issue
of public safety responsibility and accountability is not unique to the Notting Hill Carnival.
Indeed, it is relevant to all major events that take place on the public highway. We therefore
recommend that the Mayor take immediate steps to initiate an urgent review of the public safety
responsibility, accountability and decision-making issues relating to all major street events in
London. We believe that a working group should be established with representation from the
HSE, Association of London Government (ALG), Home Office, MPS, GLA, GOL, TfL, LUL and
DCMS as key partners. We further recommend that the Minister for London play a role in
facilitating these discussions.
Fragmentation of Accountability
2.98 Some of the responses to the Carnival Review Group’s interim recommendations in relation to
the possible use of Hyde Park and the Carnival Public Safety Project’s assessment of
alternative route options appears to indicate that a number of key stakeholders have not only
retreated from the 1998 position that has been secured under the LSE Study but also the
recommendations of the London Assembly in relation to major events in London 68 .
Rosenhead and Horlick-Jones have observed that in relation to the Notting Hill Carnival:
“All the organisations involved in the Carnival seemed to have similar underlying agendas
associated with the avoidance of blame and liability, and each needed to be seen to be taking
all possible reasonable measures to protect public safety, so generating a tendency to account
for actions in ‘safety audit’-like terms. Transferring blame to other agencies was another
potential escape mechanism; a factor which manifestly tended to undermine interorganisation
trust. In a fundamental way, these considerations shape each organisation’s
approach to taking part in the Carnival process, and so contribute to the fashioning of its
culture of engagement…..During fieldwork we were struck by the observation that all agencies
involved in planning for the Carnival tended to talk a great deal about safety, regarding a
‘safe and trouble free Carnival’ (a motto adopted by the MPS as the theme for the 1997
event) as the key criterion of success or failure. It became clear, however, that there was a
certain formality to the use of the concept; and by virtue of the fact that no-one could be seen
to be arguing against safety, arguments advanced on safety grounds could be potent
rhetorical devices, and hence, power relations formed and re-formed in shifting patterns with
the skilful and tactical deployment of risk-related discourse in specific settings” 69
2.99 From the Carnival Review Group’s point of view, it is important that safety is not dealt with in
a piecemeal fashion, particularly in view of the Carnival’s complexity. Safety considerations
and risk assessments had to be an integral part of the planning process and Carnival organiser
had to be ‘empowered’ so that it could fulfil its important role in coordinating and integrating
the planning efforts of all key stakeholders, including the Carnival bands. The gathering of
68
Written evidence to the London Assembly investigation was submitted by the following agencies: British Transport Police, City of
Westminster, London Fire and Emergency Protection Authority, London Ambulance Service, London Underground Limited, Metropolitan
Police Service, Royal Borough of Kensington & Chelsea and Transport for London.
69
See footnote 47, p146.
113