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Volu m e II - Purdue University Calumet

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Jason Melton<br />

<strong>Purdue</strong> <strong>University</strong> <strong>Calumet</strong><br />

Against Intuitional Freedom:<br />

An Analysis of Causation and Free Will<br />

In “The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom,” Peter van Inwagen concludes that whether our choices<br />

are determined or indetermined, freed will appears to be inconsistent (Kane). That is, whether or not each<br />

cause has a certain effect, or it does not, there is no true expression of metaphysical liberty. Despite the<br />

uncertain analysis in his contribution to the debate over free will, van Inwagen writes:<br />

It seems clear to me that when I am trying to decide between two things to do, I commit myself, by<br />

the very act of attempting to decide between the two, to the thesis that I am able to do each of<br />

them…. [W]hethor we are free or not, we believe that we are - and I think we believe, too, that<br />

we know this. (193-94)<br />

Thus freedom is mysterious, as his title explains. Yet, in his closing remarks, van Inwagen gives his<br />

“opinion” that he has made a mistake in his analysis of indeterministic causation (Kane 194). He modestly<br />

admits he does not know where he makes this mistake, but by doing so, he assumes two things: first that<br />

determinism and freedom are incompatible—a point to which I agree—and second that free will is a brute<br />

fact, something intuitively true. This latter point, I will argue, is not the case. By giving a deep analysis of<br />

causation and citing some experiments, I argue that human will does not have metaphysical freedom.<br />

Before I proceed with my arguments, I want add a disclaimer. This essay will neglect the issue of<br />

compatiblism. Compatabilists use a different definition of freedom than the one I plan to handle here.<br />

Freedom, for the purposes of this essay, is exercised when a choice is made and the agent has a real<br />

opportunity of doing otherwise. The agent cannot simply believe they are free. That is, the agent is not<br />

constrained in any way from going down their choice of one of at least two possible paths.<br />

From the definition of freedom above, it follows that if our decision making is deterministic, than<br />

our choices are causally constrained and freedom is impossible. Determinism is the view that every effect<br />

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