Volu m e II - Purdue University Calumet

another way, the two men‟s “tasters” may have changed, or their interpretation of the data from their
“tasters” has changed, or both. Note that we cannot in any meaningful way discover which has happened—
empirical tests will show us nothing of value because qualia are non-physical and thus non-empirical in
nature, and judgment standards of those qualia equally so. Because we cannot tell whether it is the qualia or
standards that have shifted, and it has no effect in the physical realm whether they shifted or not because of
the Causal Closure of the Physical, it does not matter to the physical system which has shifted. Thus, it does
not matter in the slightest to the physical world if Chase likes or dislikes the coffee, or if it is Sanborn‟s
qualia or standards about the coffee have changed. Since qualia thus do not in any way matter, it is simpler
and uses fewer assumptions to say that they do not exist, and thus by Occam‟s Razor Eliminative
materialism is better than any theory that tries to positively handle qualia. By virtue of qualia having no
impact on the physical system, we lose nothing by saying they do not exist, whereas to say they do exist is
to make an unnecessary assumption and introduces difficult, unnecessary problems. Therefore, Dennett and
the Eliminative Materialist conclude, qualia do not exist.
Dennett‟s argument that qualia do not exist relies largely on the premise that „there is no way to
tell whether it is the qualia or the judgments of those qualia that have changed in Chase and Sanborn.‟ This
premise will be referenced by proposition 1. This premise can be broken down into the conclusion of two
statements: a) something has changed in Mr. Chase/Sanborn concerning the taste of coffee, and b) that
change is the result of either his qualia changing or his standards of judging qualia changing, and there is no
way to tell which. Dennett uses the uncertainty of premise (b) to say that we can know no fact about
Chase‟s/Sanborn‟s mental existence, and thus there is no fact to be known. However, looking closely at
premises (a) and (b) it is clear that the existential claim is in premise (a), not premise (b)—it clearly says
that something has changed, the word “something” clearly and necessarily implying the existential import
that there is an event that exists and has happened to Chase/Sanborn. Premise (b) is merely a categorization
of what has been claimed to exist in premise (a).
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