Volu m e II - Purdue University Calumet

the same as this or that other quale. Introspection is one of the defining hallmarks of qualia and cannot be of
anything else, and thus any judgment about qualia is another type of qualitative state, or at the very least
necessitates the existence of the qualia that are being judged. Observe then that premise (b) becomes a
tautology: it is true that what changed is either qualia or judgment of qualia, but regardless of which disjunct
is true, it is still qualia. Thus this something that changed is a non-physical qualia, since in the hypothesis of
Dennett’s intuition pump the physical system is completely unaffected by the changes in Mr. Chase and
Sanborn. Thus I make the argument that something has changed with Chase/Sanborn, this something exists,
and this something must, if not be a non-physical quale, at least involve a non-physical quale. Therefore, the
implications in Dennett’s own example necessitate the existence of non-physical qualia, disproving his claim
that qualia do not exist.
In this paper I have shown that an analysis of Daniel Dennett’s intuition pump concerning Mr.
Chase and Sanborn which is meant to argue for the non-existence of qualia in reality necessitates the
existence of qualia. He attempts to use the uncertainty of knowing exactly what qualia are to show that
their existence is unimportant, but by admitting that something non-physical changed and having his
intuition pump necessitating it shows a necessity for the very qualia he is attempting to refute.
Works Cited
Churchland, Paul M., and Patricia Smith Churchland. "Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality."
Philosophical Topics 12.1 (1981): 121-145. Print.
Dennett, Daniel C. Consciousness in Contemporary Science. Eds. A. J. Marcel and E. Bisiach. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1992. 42-77. Print.
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