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Volu m e II - Purdue University Calumet

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Zachary R. Murphy<br />

<strong>University</strong> of Michigan – Flint<br />

Eliminating the Eliminators;<br />

A Review and Refutation of Eliminative Materialism<br />

In Philosophy of Mind the concept of qualia has caused much controversy. The quale (singular of<br />

qualia) of a mental event is what is experienced of that mental event; it is the feeling of pain or joy,<br />

emotions, or desires. The trouble with these qualia is that philosophers have not been adequately able to<br />

either reduce them to physical events or find some way around the Causal Closure of the Physical principle.<br />

They cannot be easily reduced to physical events because there is not an obvious physical substance of pain,<br />

emotion, or desire and so it is not as easy as saying “Look! There’s that qualia we’ve been looking for.” This<br />

inability to find qualia would lend to the idea that qualia are non-physical, but then we must find a way to<br />

get around the causal Closure of the Physical principle. The Causal Closure of the Physical principle states<br />

that no non-physical entity can have causal efficacy in a physical system, in other words the non-physical<br />

qualia would have no power in the physical world. Thus qualia are left in an odd state: seemingly nonphysical<br />

but at the same time seeming to have an enormous impact on our daily lives.<br />

Eliminative Materialism handles these elusive qualia by claiming that they do not exist. Since qualia<br />

can have no influence in the physical word due to the Causal Closure of the Physical, it does not matter to<br />

the physical system whether or not qualia exist. Thus by Occam’s Razor it makes fewer assumptions to say<br />

that they do not exist since it does not matter if they do exist or do not exist. Therefore, the Eliminative<br />

Materialists conclude, qualia do not exist. Daniel Dennett exemplifies this argument in his essay Quining<br />

Qualia with what he calls an intuition pump concerning Mr. Chase and Mr. Sanborn.<br />

In this essay I will show that Dennett’s intuition pump necessitates the existence of the very qualia<br />

he is arguing against.<br />

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