C - Hanford Site

WHC-SD-EN-TI-136, Rev. 0
This nozzle also failed to shut off causing an overflow of the second tank. The
employee alertly stopped the flow of fuel as quickly as possible. The employee
did not report the second spill thinking it was an insignificant amount based on
earlier conversations with N-Reactor Operations Management personnel at the
first spill.
6. Operating Conditions of Facility at Time of Event/Occurrence:
The service station was available for refueling. Three utility carts were parked
adjacent to the station in the area where the fuel truck normally parks. This
made it necessary to position the fuel truck 40 td 50 feet further away from the
service station tanks than usual.
7. Iuumediate Evaluation:
The spill area was roped off. The immediate assessment at the time of the first
spill was that the amount was not significant enough to require reporting as an
Unusual Occurrence. The Environmental Protection Representative, later in the
day, calculated the spill area and determine that the amount of fuel spilled
exceeded the unusual occurrence reporting requirements of 220 pounds (35
gallons). Subsequent review of fueling and inventory records determined that a
total of 89 gallons was spilled.
8. Immediate Action Taken and Results:
Action Taken:
o Required report was made to DOE-RL..,.
o Clean up and stabilization of the spill area was completed on January 20,
1988. The contaminated soil was loaded in 55 gallon drums for storage at
the 1100 Area 90 day Storage Facility pending disposal.
o Disciplinary action was taken against the employee for carelessness in
performance of his work and failure to report in accordance with established
procedures.
o All employees in the Road, Delivery and Equipment Operation Section have
been instructed that the use of personal radios with headphones is
inappropriate in the work place and shall not be permitted.
o The defective nozzles were replaced on January 20, 1988, and tested
to determine the cause of failure. Evaluation of the cause of the nozzle
failures was completed by February 12, 1988. The results of the evaluation
were inconclusive lending even more credence to the need for personnel
attentiveness.
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