Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

78 DECAY OF SPARTAN ARMY.The methods at sea and on land were much the same.Fleets and armies were wont to sustain each other, even tothe extent of using their men and artillery in common ; i. e.,the fleet would come close in shore, disembark its quota andtake part in the action. In sieges of cities on the seaboard,which were common, both worked together.Sparta. — Sparta's system remained substantially the samefrom the time of Lycurgus down to the Peloponnesian war.But rivalry with Athens and the necessity of possessing afleet, ifSparta would arrest her competitor's preponderancein Greece, changed the habits of centuries. Money becameessential to conduct war against wealthy Athens, and moneybrought into Sparta those things which soon drove out theancient national simplicity. And this all the more speedilyfrom its novelty. The armies now no longer contained citizensalone, though these were still the kernel ; but the Laconians,freedmen, helots and mercenary troops composed alarge part of it. The free population was divided into fiveclasses, from which the ephors called into service in war asmany as were needed, according to age. Cleombrotus, atLeuctra, had in the ranks the citizens from twenty to thirtyfive; after Leuctra, those up to forty were called in. Thenumber of freedmen who gradually crept into service waslarge. Agesilaus had three thousand in Asia. The helotswere called in only in cases of grave danger, as before Mantinoea.The kings still held the command, but came more andmore under the control of the ephors. The latter held thereal power, and went on occasion so far as to displace thekings from command. The troops were not yet on a paidbasis, excepting the helots and mercenaries ; but the kingsand their staff or suite were victualed. Up to the close ofthe Peloponnesian war the Spartans were sparing of their