Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

MACEDONIANS IN GOOD HEART. 307it was thought, be successively brought into action, but reallyin equally unserviceable and dangerous masses. The whole,including probably camp-followers, was said to be six hundredthousand strong.The effective fighting force may havebeen two hundred thousand men, but it was decidedly weakenedby the admixture of unreliable material.The very sizeof the army was its infirmity. Being assured that they werein pursuit of a flying enemy, their courage was by no meansraised at the sight ofthe Macedonian army ready for attack.Having completed his formation, Dariusnow withdrew hiscurtain of cavalry and light foot, which fell back right andleft.But finding that it could do no service near the hills, heordered the bulk of the horse over to hisright, opposite Parmenio,where on the seashore sand was the only place itcouldfind room to manoeuvre. A few he ordered to the left. Herelied on the hills to protect the latter flank, and proposed tomake his main attack with the cavalry of the right, whichwas imder Nabarzanes, and which he intended should breakthrough the Macedonian left by mere weight, and take theline in reverse. Darius took up his own station in the usualplace, the centre, in rear of the Greek mercenaries. Thewhole army extended from the mountains to the sea.The Macedonians were in the highest spirits and full ofconfidence in their own valor.The king's words had rousedtheir enthusiasm, and so soon as they came within sight ofthe enemy they grew eager for the fray. One can scarcelyimagine a situation which, according to our notions, wasworse compromised than that of Alexander at Issus. Itmight have proven so in his case. And we can only marvelat the cool daring and extraordinary ability which enabledhim to keep his troops in heart and rescue a brilliant victoryfrom such desperate danger.When Alexander perceived that Darius' cavalry was filing