Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

676 DANGER OF DEFEAT.airy on the right to inarch by the rear of the line over to theleft where they might sustain his own horse. Perceivingthis manteuvre, by which the enemy's right was weakened,Philopoemen ordered his mounted peltasts, backed by theallies and mercenaries, to move across the ravine at a placewhere he had prepared the slopes, and attack Machanidas'mercenary cavalry there stationed. The rest of both linesremained in situ. But the attack was not lucky. Machanidas'horse beat the lighter cavalry of Philopoemen, whichretired in disorder, carrying the allies with it. Machanidas,personally in command of his horse on this wing, followedhard upon. Philopoemen's force fled towards Mantinsea, Machanidasupon its heels.Philopoemen's line was at first disheartened by this defeatbut he himself saw that Machanidas had made a huge mistakein personally leaving the field.His own confidence reinspiredhis troops. He ordered his first phalangial line tomove by the flank to the left, and occupy the ground fromwhich the mounted peltasts, allies and mercenaries had beendriven, and advanced his second line into their place. Thismanoeuvre was executed with precision. Philopoemen hadcut off Machanidas from return as well as outflanked theSpartan right. Such of the mounted peltasts, allies andmercenaries as had not been scattered, and could be got together,he formed in one body, and placed in reserve in rearof his left, upon the hill slope.Philopoemen was now about to advance on the enemy, whenhe saw the Spartan phalanx moving forward to cross theravine. He decided to await their onset. Just as theyreached the bottom of the ravine, and were scrambling upthe rugged slope, he countercharged upon them, thrust themback, and from the height of the bank threw them into suchconfusion as utterly to demoralize them. He then followed