Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

them from their fancied security.appearance on theTHE ATTACK. 407So sudden was Alexander'sscene, that Ariobarzanes had barely timeto range his army in two lines in front of his camp.Alexanderdrew up in parallel order, but reinforced his left with allhis cavalry, sending itaround Ariobarzanes' right to turn it,and, if possible, take possession of his camp, while Ariobarzaneswas busy with Alexander's assault on his own front.He had already sent Ptolemy with three thousand infantryforward from his right, to the road above mentioned as leadingto the Persian camp, to a position where he could make asudden onslaught on the camp while Ariobarzanes was beingkept engaged in front and on his right. There were thusthree attacks on Ariobarzanes' rear. However questionablesuch a division of forces might be to-day, it was here not onlyjustifiable, but demanded by the circumstances.Alexander'smain force, or Ptolemy, could either of them hold head againstanything Ariobarzanes could probably bring forward, andAlexander calculatedseveral attacks would breed.especially on the demoralization theseIt was just dawn when Alexander's cavalry fell upon thecamp from the left, while Craterus, who had been holding hismen in readiness and happy Indeed to hear the sound of theking's bugles, assaulted the fortifications in the defile in itsfront.The diversion of Alexander's cavalry enabled Ptolemyto seize the camp by a coup de main with histhree thousandinfantry. Craterus, the enemy in his front being weakenedby fear and by the sudden call of Ariobarzanes for more troops,scaled the wall, drove the defenders back, and took the Persiansat the camp in reverse. These operations were nearlysimultaneous— a rare and happy conjunction—and they werefollowed by complete success.utterly unprepared (for Ariobarzanes, even ifThus attacked on all sides, andhe knew them,had believed the mountain roads to be impassable), the enemy