Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

86 MILTIADES' PLAN.were lightly armed, and though the better classes of the armywere personally brave, the bulk of the rank and file had smallnotion of fighting except under the influence of the lash.They were, moreover, recruited from everypart of the huge Persian empire, and hadnone of the espi^it de cor2)S so strong amongthe Athenians. There was no cohesion inthe Persian army ;a panic would be surelyfatal. But the Greeks did not know allthis.To them the outlook was desperate.The Persian hosts were drawn up in a deepbody on the plain extending upward fromthe seashore.Their heavy baggage camp wasfarther up the coast. Their fleet had partlybeen beached in their rear. It is probablethat at the moment of attack a portion ofthe Persian force had been reembarked for aSoldier of Marathon.projected attack on Athens. The Athenianswere on the slope of the hills a mile or so away, having protectedtheir flanks by leaning them on natural obstacles, andby some abatis or palisades. They had lain here nine days,awaiting the Persian initiative. Miltiades had concluded thatsafety lay in taking the offensive himself, and finally Callimachus'vote came in to decide in favor of his opinion. In theattack on the enemy, which Miltiades had determined upon,the Greeks ran the most imminent risk from the enemy'scavalry, of which they themselves had none ;for this, if skillfullyhandled, might fatally turn their flanks. Miltiades sawthat he must act with the greatest speed when the momentarrived, and take the Persians, if possible, unawares. He hadnot enough troops properly to fiU a front by any means aswide as that of the Persians, and was thus compelled to alterhis usual formation. He made his centre thin,— probably