Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

358 DARIUS' MISTAKES.ander's tact always rose superior to his superstition. Nodoubt tliis eclipse produced a profound impression also uponhim; but his uppermost thought was always his scheme ofconquest, and nothing which could affect his only means ofcarrying this on—his army— ever failed to engross his wholeintelligence.There is nothing more marked in the characterof Alexander than the way he browbeat his own often intolerantsuperstition by the exercise ofhis superior intelligence.Having crossed the Tigris, the army moved down the leftbank of the stream with the Gordysean Mountains (the CarducianMountains of Xenophon) on his left, and on thefourth day ran across the immediate outposts of Darius'army, — a force of one thousand cavalry.Darius had wastedthe land, and there was scarcity of breadstuffs.Extensive as Alexander's conquests had been, Darius hadin reality lost but a small part of his immense kingdom.Asia Minor, Syria, Egypt were as nothing compared to thevast territory from the sources of the Euphrates to the Indusand Jaxartes, with its brave and loyal peoples.But the GreatKing had done practically nothing for two years except torecruit another army. This he had accomplished by a generaldraft of the entire population of his empire. He hadneither attempted to prevent Alexander from overrunning hisdistant provinces, nor interfered with his sieges, nor blockadedthe mountain passes he must cross, nor— most nearsightedof all — sought to aid his own fleet in the JEgean.Not only had Darius failed to defend the mountain passes,but he had allowed Alexander to cross the last two broad anddifficult rivers unopposed. He might easily have made thecountry a desert, and have thus rendered all but impossibleAlexander's advance. The result of his system, or lack of it,was that the Macedonians had marched through a countryrich in supplies, had accumulated vast treasures, and had