Alexander : a history of the origin and growth of the art of war from ...

90 SPARTANS COME TOO LATE.ades, allowing the Persians to fly, united both wings andfought with those who had broken the centre. No other conceivablemanoeuvre than the one narrated seems to coincidewith and satisfy these statements and those of other authorities.In order to unite the wings the victorious Persian centremust first be defeated. There is little doubt that whathas been described is what occurred.The great disproportion in losses which we constantly meetwith in ancient battles can best be vouched for by pointing tothe well-known losses at such battles as Cr^cy and Agincourt,in later days. The same thing is always found in the conflictsof disciijlined with undisciplined troops, and in ancienttimes — and often in the Middle Ages — the defeated armysuffered terribly after ranks were broken and during thepursuit. Annihilation was wont to follow a defeat.Miltiades capped his work by marching speedily back toAthens, which he divined from certain signs to be the destinationof the Persians. They had naturally guessed the cityto be disgarnished of troojDS, and had at once set sail thither.He reached Athens just in time to forestall its capture.The Spartans, whose religious rules would not allow themto open a campaign before the full moon, started too late, andby three successive marches of fifty miles a day arrived atMarathon the day after the battle had been won. Grievouslychagrined, they returned to Sparta.This victory shows, prior to the days of Epaminondas,the most brilliant of the variations from the parallel order ofarmies then uniformly in vogue. The battle exhibited a setand well-digested manoeuvre promptly and intelligently executedin the heat of action.Whether Miltiades jsrepared forthe manoeuvre, or conceived and used it on the sjjur of themoment, it equally redounds to his honor.This and the succeeding battles and campaigns herein nar-