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Training of Trainers - Library - Network of Aquaculture Centres in ...

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particular animal are identified, the paths and likelihood <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduction and establishment are described,consequences are def<strong>in</strong>ed and management options are assessed. The results <strong>of</strong> these analyses arecommunicated to the Competent Authority and stakeholders (Importer/exporter). Typical risk analysis process<strong>in</strong>volves four components: hazard identification, risk assessment, risk management and risk communication.Import decisions based on scientific risk analysis will m<strong>in</strong>imize the risk <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g exotic pathogens to thecountry.Zon<strong>in</strong>g:Zon<strong>in</strong>g is a program for del<strong>in</strong>eat<strong>in</strong>g areas with<strong>in</strong> countries on the basis <strong>of</strong> aquatic animal disease status. Theadvantage <strong>of</strong> zon<strong>in</strong>g is that it allows for part <strong>of</strong> a nation’s territory to be identified as free <strong>of</strong> a particular disease,rather than hav<strong>in</strong>g to demonstrate that the entire country is free. In the past, outbreaks <strong>of</strong> disease could impact ontrade from the entire country, but by zon<strong>in</strong>g, restrictions may only apply to animals and products from the <strong>in</strong>fectedarea. Zon<strong>in</strong>g is particularly helpful for diseases where eradication is not a feasible option.Bio-security at farm levelBiosecurity refers to approaches taken to prevent, control and eradicate serious diseases <strong>of</strong> concern to thecultured species. Pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> biosecurity are normally considered for only dangerous pathogens. For any diseaseto occur, the pathogen should be able to ga<strong>in</strong> entry <strong>in</strong>to the culture system, through air, water, or land. Biosecuritymeasures implemented at the farm level should have the broad objective <strong>of</strong> prevent<strong>in</strong>g the entry, establishment,proliferation and spread <strong>of</strong> dangerous pathogens. Farm level biosecurity can be broadly def<strong>in</strong>ed as sets <strong>of</strong>standard practice that will reduce the probability <strong>of</strong> pathogen <strong>in</strong>troduction to the culture system, its amplification <strong>in</strong>the culture environment and cultured host lead<strong>in</strong>g to disease outbreak and subsequent spread. To achieve, foolpro<strong>of</strong> bio-security, it is necessary to understand all the routes by which the pathogen ga<strong>in</strong>s entry <strong>in</strong>to culture unitsand the farm level component causes (risk factors) which favor its amplification to levels sufficient to causedisease outbreaks. In the case <strong>of</strong> serious pathogen disease outbreak (e.g. WSSV), damage control should be theonly post-outbreak goal. Isolation <strong>of</strong> affected farm, removal <strong>of</strong> hosts, effective dis<strong>in</strong>fection programs, early warn<strong>in</strong>gsystems and co-operation <strong>of</strong> processors <strong>in</strong> avoid<strong>in</strong>g contam<strong>in</strong>ation would help to conta<strong>in</strong> the spread <strong>of</strong> thepathogen.Good biosecurity programs with external and <strong>in</strong>ternal barriers are vital to ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g healthy animals and toreduc<strong>in</strong>g the risk <strong>of</strong> acquir<strong>in</strong>g diseases <strong>in</strong> a farm. External barriers prevent the spread <strong>of</strong> pathogens onto and <strong>of</strong>f afarm. Internal barriers prevent the spread <strong>of</strong> the pathogen with<strong>in</strong> a farm. Adoption and implementation <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciples<strong>of</strong> good bio-security program can m<strong>in</strong>imise the probability <strong>of</strong> pathogen <strong>in</strong>troduction considerably. Pathogens,which are endemic and well established <strong>in</strong> diverse hosts f<strong>in</strong>d their way <strong>in</strong>to farms, despite the best bio-securitymeasures. It is well known that mere presence <strong>of</strong> pathogen (necessary cause) alone will not lead to diseaseoutbreaks. Identification <strong>of</strong> farm level component causes (risk factors) through epidemiological studies and theireffective management would help prevent disease outbreaks despite the presence <strong>of</strong> the necessary cause.Application <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> biosecurity will depend on the types <strong>of</strong> culture systems. It may be easy to adopt andimplement <strong>in</strong> land based systems which are under cover and <strong>in</strong> closed aquaculture systems. The practicalities <strong>of</strong>apply<strong>in</strong>g pr<strong>in</strong>ciples <strong>of</strong> biosecurity <strong>in</strong> open farm<strong>in</strong>g systems may be difficult and needs to be viewed from a differentperspective. Identification and quantification <strong>of</strong> relative risks associated with each possible route <strong>of</strong> pathogen entry<strong>in</strong>to the farms through epidemiological studies help to target resources only to the ma<strong>in</strong> risks, to make biosecuritymeasures cost effective at the farm level.Bio-security pr<strong>in</strong>ciples for prevent<strong>in</strong>g pathogen entryPossible pathogen carriers <strong>in</strong>clude <strong>in</strong>fected hosts (e.g. seed, broodstock, vectors, <strong>in</strong>termediate hosts, reservoirhosts), non-host biological carriers (e.g. birds, dogs, <strong>in</strong>sects, other predators, human be<strong>in</strong>gs) and fomites (e.g.20

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