How often were the maps produced?From the beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g of the pilot (15 August 2005) and up until 4 September 2005, the maps wereproduced five times a week (Monday to Friday). However, produc<strong>in</strong>g the maps five days a week had anumber of disadvantages. Most important, the areas identified as be<strong>in</strong>g most at risk did not alwayschange significantly from day to day. In reality, the pattern from one day to the next would not betotally stable, but would be serially correlated. Thus, some areas identified as be<strong>in</strong>g at a high risk onone day would most likely be at high risk the next day, and possibly the day after that. The reason forthis is that the data used to generate the predictions would be similar from one day to the next,reflect<strong>in</strong>g the activity of offenders. The exception would be dur<strong>in</strong>g periods of time when a large volumeof offences takes place each day. In this case, the predictions would vary considerably from one dayto the next. However, even when the daily volume of <strong>crime</strong> was low, as a few days pass thepredictions would change, keep<strong>in</strong>g pace with the flux of <strong>crime</strong>. Nevertheless, it is possible thatview<strong>in</strong>g the maps one at a time, on sequential days, may have created an illusion of stationarity. Afterall, to detect differences <strong>in</strong> the maps each day officers would have to remember the exact locationsidentified from one day to the next, and human memory and perceptual systems are known to besusceptible to distortion. To illustrate, a series of predictions are shown <strong>in</strong> Figure 5.2. Thesepredictions were generated for one area every Monday for a period of four sequential weeks. As canbe seen, <strong>in</strong> some areas the risks are relatively stable, but elsewhere more fluid. Detect<strong>in</strong>g thechanges, <strong>in</strong>stead of be<strong>in</strong>g deceived by an illusion of stationarity, requires one to look quite carefully.For example, the reader is <strong>in</strong>vited to look at the pattern from week to week <strong>in</strong> the centre of the map.This area always has some degree of risk associated with it, but the areas shaded <strong>in</strong> the darkestshade (blue for those with <strong>in</strong>tact colour perception and a colour version of the <strong>report</strong>) clearly move. Infact the blue areas always move at the level of resolution at which polic<strong>in</strong>g tactics would be deployed,but a glance at the map may suggest stability. Thought should be given to modes of depiction of mapswhich highlight change.Figure 5.2: A series of predictions for one area (blue areas are those most at risk)Further concerns about generat<strong>in</strong>g the maps each day arose because it was felt that they would notbe taken seriously if officers were forced to look at them five days a week, on top of all the other<strong>in</strong>telligence that they had to assimilate. Over exposure to the maps might mean that officers wouldlose <strong>in</strong>terest. For these reasons, it was decided that from 5 September 2005 the maps would beproduced three times a week (Monday, Wednesday and Friday). Dur<strong>in</strong>g the next six weeks the projectreceived a lot of positive reception from the officers and seemed to be used regularly. However, fromNovember onwards the residential burglary numbers dropped further and, consequently, officersperceived that the three maps produced each week were beg<strong>in</strong>n<strong>in</strong>g to look similar to each other.Consequently, the Command Team decided that at this po<strong>in</strong>t the maps would be produced twice aweek (Mondays and Thursdays). If, however, the analysts felt that there was a significant concernregard<strong>in</strong>g residential burglary and that produc<strong>in</strong>g the maps more than twice a week would be helpful,they were free to do so, and did on a number of occasions. Maps were produced twice a week from14 November 2005Tim<strong>in</strong>g issuesUnfortunately, the pilot got off to a false start because of a number of fundamental tim<strong>in</strong>g issues. First,the Divisional Commander, who had been extremely supportive and helpful dur<strong>in</strong>g the plann<strong>in</strong>g stagesof the pilot and who was <strong>in</strong>strumental <strong>in</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g ‘A’ Division as the pilot site, received a promotionand left the Division <strong>in</strong> August. As is the way, there was no advance warn<strong>in</strong>g that this would happenand thus appropriate measures could not be taken to m<strong>in</strong>imise the impact this had on the pilot. Due to49
the busy schedule of the new Divisional Commander, the research team was unable to meet with andbrief him on the project until the end of October, nearly two and a half months <strong>in</strong>to the pilot.Furthermore, key members of the Command Team had arranged annual leave and were unavailabledur<strong>in</strong>g the early days of the project period. Dur<strong>in</strong>g the first meet<strong>in</strong>g that could be arranged post-August, it was revealed that <strong>in</strong>stead of us<strong>in</strong>g the predictive capability of the maps, when the mapswere used, attention was <strong>in</strong>stead focused on the locations of burglaries that had occurred with<strong>in</strong> thelast two weeks, the approach that had previously been used on the Division (and the approach thatPromap outperformed and was designed to replace). The reason for this was that it was felt that theareas identified as be<strong>in</strong>g at risk were too large. Consequently, the software was further ref<strong>in</strong>ed togenerate predictions for smaller areas.As a result of these factors, summarised <strong>in</strong> Figure 5.3, it took a few months for the system to be f<strong>in</strong>etunedand for the Command Team members to unite to give Promap a high profile across the Division.Because the pilot was only seven months <strong>in</strong> duration and almost three months had elapsed before themaps were be<strong>in</strong>g produced <strong>in</strong> the way <strong>in</strong>tended, it was not implemented over a sufficient period to fulfilits potential. As will become apparent, the pilot expired just when it was becom<strong>in</strong>g accepted andunderstood across the Division.User-friendl<strong>in</strong>ess and impact on workloadGenerally, the Intelligence Analysts found the maps easy to produce, however, they voiced the op<strong>in</strong>ionseveral times throughout the pilot that hav<strong>in</strong>g the system on the Divisional network could havesignificantly improved the ease of produc<strong>in</strong>g the maps. More automation of the process would havealso reduced the time and effort <strong>in</strong>volved. For example, the analysts regularly spent time manuallyremov<strong>in</strong>g distraction burglaries from the dataset (as they felt that these burglaries would conform todifferent patterns and trends than other residential burglaries, although this is an empirical questionworth address<strong>in</strong>g). Only approximately 80 per cent of the data were automatically geo-coded by theforce IT system, and hence the analysts had to spend time manually geo-cod<strong>in</strong>g the rema<strong>in</strong>der. Ofcourse, these issues are germane to the force IT system rather than the Promap software. However,they are worth not<strong>in</strong>g as it is likely that similar issues may arise <strong>in</strong> other police force areas.Despite these issues, the analysts did not feel that the maps impacted greatly on their day-to-daywork. In some cases, where they were specifically responsible for summaris<strong>in</strong>g a burglary problem(e.g. produc<strong>in</strong>g a problem profile or a specific task<strong>in</strong>g document), they <strong>report</strong>ed that the system helpedto illustrate patterns and trends they felt would not otherwise have been considered. The onlysignificant effect that the production of the maps had on the Intelligence Analysts was their start<strong>in</strong>gtime at work. Because the maps had to be available to discuss <strong>in</strong> the daily brief<strong>in</strong>g meet<strong>in</strong>g at9:15a.m., the analysts had to ensure they were at work by 8a.m. By the end of the pilot, each analystwas only produc<strong>in</strong>g the maps once a week, and so the time <strong>in</strong>volved was not a considerable<strong>in</strong>convenience.50
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1. UCL JILL DANDO INSTITUTE OF CRIM
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ContentsAcknowledgementsExecutive s
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2.5 Illustration of a simple neares
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Project outcomesPatterns of burglar
- Page 10 and 11: those that involved collaboration w
- Page 12 and 13: 1. IntroductionThis report represen
- Page 14 and 15: optimally calibrated system, the go
- Page 16 and 17: e ij = n .j x n i.nWhere, e ij is t
- Page 18 and 19: Table 2.2: Knox ratios for Mansfiel
- Page 20 and 21: Table 2.6: Monte-Carlo results for
- Page 22 and 23: Table 2.10: Weekly Knox ratios for
- Page 24 and 25: Table 2.14: Monte-Carlo results for
- Page 26 and 27: Figure 2.1: The five policing areas
- Page 28 and 29: The results for area 5 again demons
- Page 30 and 31: The bandwidth used to generate the
- Page 32: a densely populated urban area this
- Page 35 and 36: Table 2.24: Average number of crime
- Page 37 and 38: Patrolling efficiencyAs discussed e
- Page 39 and 40: 3. Tactical options and selecting a
- Page 41 and 42: Selecting a pilot siteThe decision
- Page 43 and 44: Table 3.2: Tactical options matrixT
- Page 45 and 46: Type ofinterventionStudyUse ofintel
- Page 47 and 48: Other potential tactical optionsAt
- Page 49 and 50: 4. System development and evolution
- Page 51 and 52: the same time of day as each other
- Page 53 and 54: unfortunately, implementation or us
- Page 55 and 56: any tactical options were employed
- Page 57 and 58: the end of the pilot. In addition t
- Page 59: Figure 5.1: Promap dissemination pr
- Page 63 and 64: Tactical deliveryCommand Team daily
- Page 65 and 66: Table 5.3: Number of respondents wh
- Page 67 and 68: permitted, up to four plain clothed
- Page 69 and 70: observation made by those who used
- Page 71 and 72: A simple time-series analysis (see
- Page 73 and 74: Two approaches were used to compute
- Page 75 and 76: Figure 6.3: Changes in the proporti
- Page 77 and 78: Figure 6.5: Changes in the proporti
- Page 79 and 80: With respect to implementation real
- Page 81 and 82: ReferencesAggresti, A. (1996) An In
- Page 83 and 84: Johnson, S.D., Summers, L., and Pea
- Page 85 and 86: Appendix 1. The information technol
- Page 87 and 88: Figure A1.2: Stand-alone applicatio
- Page 89 and 90: Recommendations that may be realise
- Page 91 and 92: Section 1: knowledge and understand
- Page 93 and 94: Extra Comments (please outline any
- Page 95 and 96: In relation to the evaluation of in
- Page 97 and 98: Time-series analysisFor the purpose
- Page 99 and 100: Figure A3.1: Changes in the spatial
- Page 101 and 102: Figure A3.2: Lorenz curves showing
- Page 103 and 104: To recapitulate and elaborate, the
- Page 105 and 106: Concluding comments on methodThe te
- Page 107 and 108: Figure A5.2: An enlargement of the
- Page 109 and 110: Figure A5.6: Prospective map magnif
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