Handbook for Methane Control in Mining - AMMSA
Handbook for Methane Control in Mining - AMMSA
Handbook for Methane Control in Mining - AMMSA
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179ELIMINATING IGNITION SOURCESElectrical equipment <strong>in</strong> tunnels may or may not be explosion-proof, depend<strong>in</strong>g on the level ofthe hazard. The OSHA safety and health standards <strong>for</strong> underground construction [29 CFR1926.800] conta<strong>in</strong> the applicable requirements and def<strong>in</strong>itions. OSHA has two hazard classifications,denoted “potentially gassy” and “gassy.” These are based on the results of air monitor<strong>in</strong>g,on the local geology, on whether there has been a flammable gas ignition, and on whetherthere is a connection to another tunnel that is gassy. For the air monitor<strong>in</strong>g, the classificationtrigger level is 10% of the LEL, and the specific classification depends on the length of time <strong>for</strong>which this gas level or higher is observed. Tunnels so classified must meet additional ventilation,gas monitor<strong>in</strong>g, and equipment requirements. Some states have their own regulations as well.It was mentioned earlier that a flammable gas concentration of 5% of the LEL or higher shouldbe regarded as an action level to improve safety. Tak<strong>in</strong>g action at the 5% level will improve thechances that the 10% level will not be reached.In the event that a large pocket of gas is encountered, some equipment may still be used. At am<strong>in</strong>imum, this <strong>in</strong>cludes fans and telephones. However, such equipment must always beexplosion-proof.Tunnel contractors must bear <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d that provid<strong>in</strong>g explosion-proof equipment does not <strong>in</strong> itselfelim<strong>in</strong>ate the possibility of a spark source. For <strong>in</strong>stance, sparks generated by cutt<strong>in</strong>g tools strik<strong>in</strong>grock often have enough energy to ignite an explosive mixture. Weld<strong>in</strong>g or strik<strong>in</strong>g a matchto light a cigarette can have the same effect.THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN FACTORS AND MULTIPLE PREVENTIVE ACTIONSThe importance of human factors and multiple preventive actions <strong>in</strong> reduc<strong>in</strong>g methane explosionrisk was identified <strong>in</strong> a study by Kissell and Goodman [1991]. Us<strong>in</strong>g a fault tree, they exam<strong>in</strong>edthe possible causes of tunnel methane explosions. The <strong>in</strong>tent was to provide a relative rank<strong>in</strong>g ofthe events or comb<strong>in</strong>ations of events most likely to contribute to an explosion.Human factors. In the Kissell and Goodman study, 15 “<strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g events” were identifiedto represent start<strong>in</strong>g conditions that lead to an explosion (Table 14–1). As evidenced <strong>in</strong> Table14–1, most <strong>in</strong>itiat<strong>in</strong>g events <strong>in</strong>volve a human factor rather than an eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g specification.In other words, safe conditions require the everyday vigilance of those work<strong>in</strong>g underground.This does not underm<strong>in</strong>e the importance of good eng<strong>in</strong>eer<strong>in</strong>g design, only that the job of provid<strong>in</strong>gsafe conditions just beg<strong>in</strong>s with design. For example, workers must ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong> overlap <strong>in</strong>auxiliary systems as m<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g advances, regularly check the ventilation quantity and methaneconcentration, and adequately service the methane monitors. Equally important, workers mustnot smoke underground; those who do risk caus<strong>in</strong>g an explosion if methane is present.Multiple preventive actions. Another conclusion from the fault-tree study was that largereductions (over 90%) <strong>in</strong> the risk of an explosion only result from multiple preventive actions.For example, a ventilation upgrade or a methane monitor upgrade by itself offers risk reductionsunder 50%. A risk reduction of 90% or more would typically require both of these, plus additionalactions such as a no-smok<strong>in</strong>g rule and more thorough gas checks dur<strong>in</strong>g weld<strong>in</strong>g.