Universal-Womens-accesss-to-justice-Publications-Practitioners-Guide-Series-2016-ENG

V
WOMEN’S ACCESS TO JUSTICE FOR GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE 179
Protection orders that rely on stereotypes constitute
secondary victimization
In some jurisdictions, certain restraining orders may require
the perpetrator to desist from his behaviour but may at the
same time also seek to control the victim’s “provocative
behaviour”. Such orders may violate women’s right to equality
and access to justice since they are predicated on stereotypical
assumptions that a woman is responsible for the violence
committed against her, rather than holding the man to account.
These ‘mutual’ orders tend to deny women their equality of
access to the court, because if women go back to court
complaining of further violence, the assumption is made that
she has continued to be “provocative” leading to a failure of the
courts and the authorities to protect her. 487
Enforcement of protection orders
Protection orders are only effective if they are diligently
enforced in cases of breach. 488 The enforcement of protection
orders must be made a mandatory, not discretionary, duty of
police and other State officials concerned with such orders. 489
Effective implementation mechanisms should be created, 490 for
example through the establishment of a registration system for
judicial protection, restraining or barring orders that enable
police or criminal justice officials to quickly determine whether
such an order is in force. 491 Adequate resources must be
invested to ensure implementation; training for police and
justice system officials must be undertaken; and model
protocols and directives that can be followed by police should
be designed and implemented. 492
487
UN Handbook for Legislation on Violence against Women, above
note 413, page 49.
488
Lenehan (Gonzales) v USA, above note 479, paragraph 163.
489
Ibid, paragraph 215(4).
490
Ibid, paragraph 215(4).
491
Updated Model Strategies and Practical Measures, above note 380,
paragraph 15(h).
492
Lenehan (Gonzales) v USA, above note 479, paragraph 215(4).