The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
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knower to th<strong>in</strong> an objective representation <strong>in</strong> any other way, but also relative to cultural<br />
change. In other words, even if it the character <strong>of</strong> our cognition rema<strong>in</strong>s an a priori<br />
condition for the possibility <strong>of</strong> experience at any one historical moment, the source <strong>of</strong> this<br />
character <strong>of</strong> necessity may nonetheless be a posteriori, grounded on outer cultural <strong>and</strong><br />
historical conditions.<br />
Schulze identifies a second possible source for the necessity <strong>of</strong> synthetic<br />
judgments that Schulze identifies is sensation. For <strong>in</strong>stance, accord<strong>in</strong>g to him it is not<br />
only possible that all knowledge ―has its orig<strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong> the efficacy that objects present<br />
realiter‖ (i.e., generic empiricism), but also that ―the necessity encountered <strong>in</strong> certa<strong>in</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
its areas is generated by the special manner <strong>in</strong> which external th<strong>in</strong>gs occasion cognition <strong>in</strong><br />
the m<strong>in</strong>d by affect<strong>in</strong>g it.‖ 122 Before the presence <strong>of</strong> any object, it may be possible to<br />
th<strong>in</strong>k its absence (as Kant does <strong>in</strong> the ―Aesthetic‖ with respect to the exhibition <strong>of</strong> space<br />
as form <strong>of</strong> outer sense), but not cease to have a specific sensation <strong>of</strong> it. In his words:<br />
―Here we have an actual case, therefore, <strong>of</strong> objects outside us arous<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> the m<strong>in</strong>d by<br />
their <strong>in</strong>fluence on it a consciousness <strong>of</strong> necessity, mak<strong>in</strong>g it impossible to perceive<br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g otherwise than it is perceived.‖ 123 While the s<strong>in</strong>gular sensations may be<br />
subject to a very specific moment <strong>in</strong> the presence <strong>of</strong> any one object, <strong>and</strong> hence not<br />
permanent, for Schulze there is nonetheless a necessity present <strong>in</strong> this occasion that is<br />
common to all perceptual experience. In this way, external objects could generate<br />
122 Schulze, Gottlob Ernst. ―Aenesidemus.‖ In: Between Kant <strong>and</strong> Hegel: Texts <strong>in</strong> the<br />
Development <strong>of</strong> Post-Kantian Idealism, ed <strong>and</strong> trans. George Di Giovanni <strong>and</strong> H. S.<br />
Harris. Revised Edition. Hackett Publish<strong>in</strong>g Co. Indianapolis/Cambridge, 2000, 142-3.<br />
123 Ibid., 144.<br />
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