The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

Recommendations

Info

fulfill that quest). 55 In the KrV, this means that with this idea of god, reason can neither a) extend the subject‘s cognition as to what exists; nor b) provide an a priori account of the possibility of the synthesis by which the subject is given the connections of real properties in a thing. This is because realities cannot be given a priori to the subject and synthetic cognition can only be achieved in relation to experience (in concreto). 56 The question here is how Kant gets from the same concept of Sein überhaupt to an opposite conclusion on the possibility of an ontological proof. From a strictly critical perspective, it is possible to claim that in so far as Kant now rearticulates the conditions for real ―inner‖ possibility 57 from the perspective of the limited cognitive resources of the subject, any possible cognition of an appeal to a transcendent entity is preemptively 55 KrV, B382-3. 56 KrV, A602/B630. The analytic mark of possibility, which consists in the fact that mere positings [Positionen] (realities) do not generate a contradiction, of course, cannot be denied of this concept; since, however, the connection of all real properties in a thing is a synthesis about whose possibility we cannot judge a priori because the realities are not given to us specifically – and even if this were to happen no judgment at all could take place because the mark of possibility of synthetic cognitions always has to be sought only in experience, to which, however, the object of an Idea can never belong – [ …]. Original: Das analytische Merkmal der Möglichkeit, das darin besteht, daß bloße Positionen (Realitäten) keinen Widerspruch erzeugen, kann ihm zwar nicht gestritten werden; da° aber die Verknüpfung aller realen Eigenschaften in einem Dinge eine Synthesis ist, über deren Möglichkeit wir a priori nicht urtheilen können, weil uns die Realitäten specifisch nicht gegeben sind, und, wenn dieses auch geschähe, überall gar kein Urtheil darin stattfindet, weil das Merkmal der Möglichkeit synthetischer Erkenntnisse immer nur in der Erfahrung gesucht werden muß, zu welcher aber der Gegenstand einer Idee nicht gehören kann […]. 57 Although in need of qualification, this pre-critical metaphysical terminology can be said to be congruent to the concept of real possibility thought of according to the postulates of empirical thought. For example, Kant does something similar when in the introduction of MAN he uses the metaphysical concept of ―nature‖ (i.e., essence) in the introduction to the MAN, even as he is presenting the reader with a critical and thus completely revised concept of it via a science of nature grounded on the results of the KrV. Ak: 4: 467-8. Walford, 183-4. 40
foreclosed. This is precisely what the postulates of empirical thinking are to address: the modality of the relationship of the subject with regards to its object of experience (e.g., the possible is ―whatever agrees with the formal conditions of experience; etc.).‖ 58 The establishment of the subject-based conditions for the possibility of cognizing an object with all of its determinations – conceived through a rule governed synthesis of intuition under a concept – replaces here the question of the elements and conditions of the inner possibility of a particular Dasein and its ultimate ground in the necessary existence of an entity. Thus, while the concept of being in general as it appears in the Transcendental Dialectic is the same as in BDG, the KrV‘s perspectival shift puts into question the very theoretical interest in the ―it is‖ when the attempt to understand and ground its possibility, actuality and necessity is performed with the ―trick‖ of a ―God‘s eye view,‖ both with respect to a particular Dasein and an absolutely necessary entity. 59 The impossibility of accounting for the unconditional necessity of an existing entity, however, does not mean that the subject‘s idea of god is irrational in itself. The logic behind the theoretical necessity of an (empty) idea of this entity resides in reason‘s 58 KrV, A218/B265. 59 This a concept (or expression) borrowed from Haraway. While it is indeed true that Haraway uses this concept within a theory of the situated nature of objectivity that is far more concrete, organic and affective than what Kant‘s subjectivism can offer in its original form, it is also true that the critical turn effectuated by the latter is a genuine precursor to her position. Kant is a target of Haraway‘s critique of Western epistemology – qua abstraction and formalism – but both thinkers are committed to accounting for the possibility of objectivity through immanent conditions in which the subject is a significant player in determining or accounting for the character of any object (it may even be possible to stretch this to include their shared concern with the significance of the relationship between objective knowledge and the possibility of politics/ethics – this congruence would apply only with respect to the usefulness of the former towards the latter and not vice-versa – as it would be the case for Haraway. Cf. Haraway, D. ―Situated Knowledges‖ or ―Ciborg Manifesto.‖ 41
Page 1 and 2: The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
Page 3 and 4: Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
Page 5 and 6: Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
Page 7 and 8: Preface The interest in the Opus po
Page 9 and 10: Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
Page 11 and 12: Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
Page 13 and 14: of receptivity‖ reveals also the
Page 15 and 16: enables thinkers in the twenty firs
Page 17 and 18: form of ―principles of synthesis
Page 19 and 20: a transition that has its own ―sp
Page 21 and 22: the English language literature tha
Page 23 and 24: his account was circular. As Först
Page 25 and 26: fascicle written by Kant between 18
Page 27 and 28: the doctrine of self-positing attem
Page 29 and 30: preemptively with this retrospectiv
Page 31 and 32: meaning of its particular relations
Page 33 and 34: ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
Page 35 and 36: ecause the only operative rule for
Page 37 and 38: In the context of the BDG, the natu
Page 39 and 40: 3. It is unconditionally impossible
Page 41 and 42: . We know that a condition for inne
Page 43 and 44: Realerklährung - an explanation of
Page 45 and 46: ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
Page 47 and 48: Negation can also result from chang
Page 49: ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
Page 53 and 54: none of this is particularly new. N
Page 55 and 56: elations of thoroughgoing determina
Page 57 and 58: that exhibits it must share in the
Page 59 and 60: of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63 and 64: category causality in the second an
Page 65 and 66: Just as time functions as the form
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102:
knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104:
doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106:
to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108:
Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110:
―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112:
the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114:
Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116:
This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118:
it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120:
perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122:
apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124:
and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126:
synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128:
on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130:
distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132:
object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134:
doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136:
perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138:
an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140:
this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142:
feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144:
that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146:
true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148:
This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150:
Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152:
of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154:
there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156:
objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158:
The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160:
introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162:
where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164:
What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166:
epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168:
outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170:
ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172:
These passages by no means say the
Page 173 and 174:
sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
Page 175 and 176:
schematization. What that is like w
Page 177 and 178:
from which the ―I think‖ gains
Page 179 and 180:
The path taken to arrive at a basic
Page 181 and 182:
As seen in chapter four, the relati
Page 183 and 184:
In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
Page 185 and 186:
MAN that, indeed, no science unders
Page 187 and 188:
medical doctors, educators, and phy
Page 189 and 190:
the grounding of the human sciences
Page 191 and 192:
______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
Page 193 and 194:
S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196:
Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
Page 197:
187
show all

The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?