The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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That Kant takes the first structural level to entail apperception or self-consciousness as an a priori logical act is obvious from these passages‘ reference to ―the first act;‖ the question is what is meant by this. One way of narrowing the possible ways of tackling this interpretive question is to take as a guiding thread the reference to ―Vorstellungsvermögen‖ or faculty of representation from the first two passages. Since the first passage also notes that this act is ground of all other representations, the natural place to begin in the KrV is the second part of the ―‘Doctrine of Elements,‖ especially in ―Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.‖ It is there where Kant addresses the dependence of all thinking and cognition of the understanding on the possibility of self-consciousness. In other words, it is necessary that apperception be possible for there to be any mental representation at all. That representations need to be able to be accompanied by self-consciousness expressed under the proposition ―I think‖ is one of the ways to understand in what sense it can be said that they are grounded by it as a logical act. There are at least three ways to grasp the perspective under which the possibility of representations relies on what Kant designates distinctly as the ―the analytical unity of apperception.‖ 142 Kant points to two instances in which we are not capable of attaching the representation ―I think‖ to other representations and where as a result these so-called representations can be said to ―either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.‖ 143 This occurs, first, if the representations contradict themselves. In other words, in the case that two representations are contradictory, they cannot be thought together by our understanding. 142 KrV, B133. 143 KrV, B132. 102
Not being able to be thought by the understanding implies that there is no way for the expression ―I think‖ to be attached to such so-called representation. If the ―I‖ of the subject knower cannot think this contradiction then it is nothing to it. The impossibility for this lies in a formal aspect of thought: that it cannot violate the principle of non- contradiction (parallel in form and function to what in BDG was called the formal or logical element of inner possibility). Second, and perhaps more intuitively, it occurs when representations are unconscious. Any representation that is unconscious, or rather, incapable of becoming conscious, cannot be attached to the ―I think‖ because it is not accessible to be presented to thought. In this case, the impossibility lies in the very nature of the representation itself, that is to say, taken as material of thought (parallel in function to BDG‘s material or real element of inner possibility). 144 From this discussion, what has been clarified is that when the ―I think‖ cannot be attached to a representation, then that representation is nothing for the subject knower; in fact, since it is nothing, the very use of the term ―representation‖ within this context loses all coherence. The third and most significant way in which apperception grounds representations concerns its necessity for the possibility that objects (Gegentänden) be given to us. We find this indicated in the section of the ―Deduction‖ when he writes: ―otherwise 144 This should not be taken, however, as an indication that Kant does not allow for unconscious representations in the mind within his overall philosophical position. For Kant, there may very well be unconscious representations for the subject, but they can only function as affections that influence a subject‘s ―feelings and desires, without my being aware of it‖ (Kant to Herz, May 26, 1789. Ak: 11:52). From an epistemological perspective, however, that which is unconscious to the subject knower, because of this very fact, cannot be cognized as representation. It appears correct to say also that he does not identify the ―unconscious‖ as a faculty or power of the mind, as it can be taken to be within a framework such as psychoanalytic theory. In this sense, these positions can be said to be essentially different. 103
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63 and 64: category causality in the second an
Page 65 and 66: Just as time functions as the form
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156: objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160: introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162: where the earlier indeterminate emp
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What is given first to the power of
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epresentation that was given prior
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outside itself, which it can then d
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ground that can accommodate the exp
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These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
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Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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