The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

there Kant nevertheless asks: ―And why does it not present a double I, but nevertheless a
doubled consciousness of this I, first that of mere thinking but then also that of inner
perception (rational and empirical); that is, discursive and intuitive apperception, of
which the first belongs to logic and the second to anthropology (as physiology)? The
former is without content (matter of cognition), while the latter is provided with a content
by inner sense.‖ 206 The distinction made here between a presence of a ―double I‖ versus
a ―doubled consciousness of this I‖ shrinks the distance between the two different forms
of apperception by what appears to be a mere centering of a difference originally
contained in a singular consciousness of a subject capable of both thought and intuition;
once again, the same ―I‖ can be said to be conscious of itself or take itself as an Object in
a twofold manner (qua logic and qua perception). The latter supports the perspectival
reading of the meaning of the movement between the two levels in the doctrine. And yet,
the answer he provides here to the question as to why this is the case, falls back into a
separation between the logical and the source of the material for perception – of the real.
Their distinct philosophical and epistemological domains are again separate, the grounds
for which had been established in the KrV.
Without yet solving the problem of what Kant means in the doctrine when he
asserting that the logical apperception leads to the real, it is nonetheless worth
remembering that this is precisely the problem identified in chapter two entitled
―Historical and Facultative Tensions‖ section of the dissertation. There is yet no clear
indication as to whether or not in the end the Selbstsetzungslehre provides what would
have constituted a satisfactory answer to Kant‘s contemporary critics and students. In
206 Ak: 7:141. Louden 253n.
143