The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

an inference: [...] 186
The first sentence ties the idea of self-consciousness as a kind of self-objectification with
the explicit claim that the object that results from this logical act is not just merely
logical, but also exists in that very condition. It confirms also that in the generality of the
object that is now claimed to exist, is nonetheless empty of determinations or manifold.
It nonetheless leaves open the possibility of this existing object‘s potential
determinability
Kant‘s discussion of apperception in relationship to the existential ―I am‖ brings
into play all of the different elements that have been addressed so far in this discussion of
the first analytic level of the Selbstsetzungslehre. A unified picture begins to arise of this
first positing. However, before concluding the discussion on apperception, what follows
is a short detour on Kant‘s critique of Descartes Cogito syllogism – a reference that, as
some of the passages have already shown, can be found innumerable times in the
doctrine.
i. d. The Locus of Kant‘s Critique of Descartes
In the KrV, Kant‘s main criticisms against Descartes are three: first, that the
subject knower‘s inner sense cannot provide the basis for an argument for the existence
of things outside the subject; second, that the metaphysical nature of the ―I‖ cannot be
186 Ak: 22:89-90. My translation (the passage is absent from Förster‘s translation).
Original: ―Alle Erkentnis hebt von dem Bewustseyn meiner selbst an, d.i. mich selbst der
ich denke das Subject zugleich als Gegenstand des Denkens als Object vorzustellen.
Dieser Act der Apperception (sum cogitans) ist noch kein Urtheil (iudicium) über ein
Object d.i. noch kein Ver|hältnis eines Prädicats zum Subject wodurch ein Erkentnis
begründet wird sondern ich bin mir selbst überhaupt ein Gegenstand (apprehensio
simplex) noch weniger ein Schlus: [...]‖
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