The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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ecause in actuality the subject is always already situated in this material space – which it nonetheless must be – but because the conditions for the possibility of the ―I think‖ assumes an undetermined empirical intuition that elicits the act of thought called ―original attribution.‖ Knowing that space and time are a priori forms of intuition, the possibility of this original attribution assumes already the necessity that its content be a spatio-temporally conditioned material manifold. Otherwise, it would never be able to be given in the first place. Kant‘s Leningrad reflection, moreover, explains the way in which it is possible to account for this complex function of space: a necessary form of outer sense that allows for the possibility of outer affection, yet posited a priori through a self- affection that constitutes it into an object that can be given to the subject knower in experience. This same necessary possibility of outer affection, moreover, gives the subject a spatial location and opens the question as to the necessity of the embodiment of this subject. Due to this analysis of the conditions of the ―I think,‖ Kant elaborates upon the relationship between the sensible ―I‖ and the thinking ―I‖ that had been left underdeveloped in his earlier work. The key to this development resides in the acknowledgment of the role of a ―sensing I.‖ Just as the spatio-temporal form of the undetermined empirical intuition becomes necessary, so does the interactive nature of the faculty of sensibility as capable of receptivity. This means that the subject‘s embodied and living nature is also brought into the fold of receptivity. The body is both passive channel and in active relationship to the whole of the posited manifold. In fact, it must be so. Without the latter possibility, no arousal of the other facultative acts would be possible at all. The content is not just a field of dynamic forces, but ―sensible space. 172
In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehre is interpreted as a source for the elucidation of the nature of empirical consciousness and its relationship to the universal concept of the subject, then it is indeed a first answer to the imperative to ―know thyself.‖ It is indeed an answer that provides the resources from which to continue the path of self-knowledge. This, of course, is not new to Kant‘s project. The entire KrV is an investigation that results in knowledge of the character of the subject in so far as its a priori transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience are revealed. There, ―self-knowledge‖ is thematized in at least two distinct ways. The first is when he shows that the ―I‖ as it is ―in itself‖ cannot be cognized, due the discursive nature of our mode of thought and the temporal form of all intuition. In other words, this is because we can know ourselves only as and in appearance. As a consequence of his position, the metaphysical project of ―rational psychology‖ could no longer give reasons for the legitimacy of its claims. This is in itself already a kind of self- knowledge; a knowledge of what cannot be theoretically known. The second is when in the Refutation of Idealism he argues that self-consciousness is itself first made possible only because there is a real entity in outer sense that is cognized by the subject; the cognition of an object not only assumes that something real be given to the subject in intuition, but also that the latter grasp what is given through its forms of thought—most importantly here is the category of substance. It is the determination of the content of intuition for the cognition of this substance that results simultaneously in the determination of the subject's inner sense. The successive relations of all given intuitive contents in the fluidity of time as a priori form in inner sense are determined as the subject grasps the temporal persistence of the appearance of the object, and thinks it as 173
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
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it perceives only its effects. In a
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category causality in the second an
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Just as time functions as the form
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spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
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points to the fact that in the act
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latter (as for the other dynamical
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unity is expressed. In the second a
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Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
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idealize what can be claimed to be.
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The structure in the schematic of t
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critical model entails thus the sub
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continuous reiteration of the most
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[machen] of experience with the sou
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and not actuality. 103 These fields
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functions as ground to a universal
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appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
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Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
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thought. While the spirit of the cr
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faculties of representation in ligh
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particularly in their presence, uni
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knower to thin an objective represe
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doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
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to intuition. This status brings to
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Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
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―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
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the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
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Not being able to be thought by the
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This connection between the single
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it concerns the possibility of the
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perspective of its relation to the
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apperception and b) the synthetic o
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and the section ―On the Paralogis
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synthetic determination of its intu
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on the possibility of attaching the
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distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
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Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
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Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160: introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162: where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164: What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166: epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168: outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170: ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172: These passages by no means say the
Page 173 and 174: sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
Page 175 and 176: schematization. What that is like w
Page 177 and 178: from which the ―I think‖ gains
Page 179 and 180: The path taken to arrive at a basic
Page 181: As seen in chapter four, the relati
Page 185 and 186: MAN that, indeed, no science unders
Page 187 and 188: medical doctors, educators, and phy
Page 189 and 190: the grounding of the human sciences
Page 191 and 192: ______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
Page 193 and 194: S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196: Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
Page 197: 187
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