The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

points to the fact that in the act of positing what the imagination is bringing forth is, as it
were, already there qua form of space. The real difference is that here the imagination
―translates‖ a form of a priori intuition – impossible to determine from within the
singular field of intuition alone – into a general form of representation accessible to the
conscious mind. Thus, despite what could be perceived as an apparent demotion in the
―productive‖ character of its transcendental synthesis, from a subjectivist point of view,
what is posited is equivalent to bringing a representation into the distributive unity of all
other representations under the same ―I.‖
Or perhaps, looking back, the concept just means to place, which would support
the Cambridge translation as well bring to light that a circle, a line, and a point (of unity
of the perpendicular lines) are limitations of space. In other words, they are the
appropriate form that any transcendental synthesis of the manifold of a priori space
would take due to the latter‘s nature as unbounded and singular whole. The simple
synthetic act to posit the point of intersection as opposed to move does indeed give
credence to distinguishing between thinking and representing.
Clearly, this first attempt at deciphering some unique function of the concept of
setzen within the more constructive aspects of KrV has posed more questions than given
answers. However, if nothing else, it has also opened up possible interpretative paths and
located a not insignificant conceptual space where the verb can function within the
system of Kant‘s critical philosophy, which is in the sphere of interaction among: given
and a priori intuition, self-affection of the mind, and the possibility and necessity of a
pure transcendental synthetic act of the imagination upon the mere forms of intuitions.
The latter is at the heart of Kant‘s theoretical project and the verb setzen appears to
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