The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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an ―act.‖ This is what Kant refers to as the ―spontaneity‖ of thought. 159 An instance of this activity has already been described above in so far as the necessity of the ―I think‖ being able to be attached to all representations as their condition entails an activity of unifying or synthesizing. 160 Up to this point the notion of apperception referred to in the three quoted passages from the Op has been elucidated by taking as an interpretative thread Kant's reference to it as ground for the subject knower's Vorstellungsvermögen. The necessity that it be possible for the ―I think‖ to be able to be attached to all representations, both in pure thought or in the cognition of objects, has been discussed: a) in those cases when this possibility is negated; b) as the analytic unity of consciousness; c) in terms the function of unity presupposed both for the latter as well as for judgments, concepts and objects to be possible; d) from the perspective of its merely logical nature of thinking in finite rational beings; and finally e) as the result of the spontaneity in human thought. As a result, in this section there are two candidates for understanding what Kant means when he writes that self-consciousness is a logical act: a) the analytic unity of 159 KrV, A68/B93. 160 In addition to this function, in §6 of his lectures on logic, Kant also refers to the more specific ability of the subject knower to come up with or analyze concepts by means of comparison, reflection, and abstraction. Cf. Allison, H. Kant‘s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense. New Haven, Yale University Press, Revised Edition 2004, 80. This general activity in thought reveals the aspect of Kant‘s criticism directed against an empiricism in which the unity, connections, or, relations between and among impressions originate not from thought, but instead from the passive repetitions of patterns within impressions that allow for the formation of associations. Indeed, it is precisely because neither the representation ―I think‖ nor any concept whatsoever can be found in these impressions that Kant can argue that it is the a priori activity, spontaneity, or, synthesizing power of thought that is a necessary condition for the possibility of all cognition, a priori or empirical. As such, apperception as a logical act is a principle for the possibility of all representations. 110
apperception and b) the synthetic one. Both of these concern the sphere of thought alone, itself discursive in nature and conditioned by a necessary connection to a function of unity in a thinking ―I.‖ In both cases of apperception there is also an ―act‖ that can be identified. In the analytic, it is the act of thinking the logical ―I‖ that unites all conscious representations in thought; in the synthetic, it is the act of a synthesis in thought that makes it possible for the subject to contain all representations in the unity of an ―I.‖ And, finally, both are expressed already in an ―I think.‖ With this indeterminacy in mind, this section by no means exhausts the meaning of what Kant means by apperception as a logical act. The full significance of this expression will be evident, however, once all of the sections that address the first level of the doctrine of self-positing are elucidated; the thematic sections, while not contingent, remain artificial as they are philosophically inextricably related. ii. b. Apperception as ―Object‖ The way in which apperception can be said to be a logical act was discussed in the previous section by focusing on its function as ground of all representations to be possible for a subject knower. This same apperception as a logical act can be addressed also from the perspective of the subject‘s possibility of relating to itself as an Object. In the first analytic level of the Selbstsetzungslehre this occurs in two ways. On the one hand, apperception as a logical act is itself already a form of self-objectification. On the other, the same apperception understood as a logical act is that ―wodurch‖ or ―through which‖ the subject is capable self-objectification. As a result, passages from the Op reveal two aspects to apperception, one as self-objectification and one the as condition for 111
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
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it perceives only its effects. In a
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category causality in the second an
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Just as time functions as the form
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spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119: perspective of its relation to the
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156: objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160: introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162: where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164: What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166: epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168: outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170: ground that can accommodate the exp
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These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
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Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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