The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

preemptively with this retrospective elucidation. First, because the term is many times
repeated and used in philosophy and theory as if its meaning were self-evident. While, as
Kant says, ―[i]t is certain that anywhere else in philosophy the concept could confidently
be employed in the undeveloped form in which it occurs in ordinary usage,‖ the centrality
of the concept of Setzung to the object of this investigation requires a more subtle
understanding. 27 Second, because the term is prevalent in the works of many German
idealist thinkers. 28 This means that it is important to work out the distinctive uses that
may be found in Kant‘s work and evaluate the prevalence and function of the concept in
his pre-Op thought. With this in hand, one is on firmer ground to consider not only the
extent to which the Selbstsetzungslehre may or may not threaten the integrity of his
critical position, but also situate the latter with regards to some of his contemporary
thinkers. Finally, this overview of the concept is useful because within Kant‘s doctrine of
self-positing, there is a systematic distinction in the uses of the word setzen and machen
that is many times understated within the secondary literature on the doctrine and can
potentially lead to dogmatic reading of it. 29 Thus, by beginning with a clear
understanding of the first, one is then able to see in what way it relates to the second, and
hopefully appreciate that this late doctrine of Kant‘s is just as much of the self-positing of
the subject knower as it is of the subject knower‘s self-construction and making of
27 BDG, Ak: 2:70. Walford, 116. Kant‘s comment is about the closely related concept of
existence, yet it is just as applicable to positing.
28 J.G. Fichte stands out among them.
29 In his monumental interpretation of Kant‘s Opus postumum, Adickes, for example,
does not make any explicit conceptual distinction between them during his exposition of
the doctrine.
19