The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
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<strong>The</strong>se passages by no means say the same th<strong>in</strong>g; <strong>in</strong>stead, the first one is an attempt at<br />
address<strong>in</strong>g the possibility <strong>of</strong> the second one. <strong>The</strong> first passage is also the one that, <strong>in</strong> the<br />
language <strong>of</strong> transcendental philosophy, is <strong>in</strong> need <strong>of</strong> clarification. In fact, it expresses the<br />
crux <strong>of</strong> the doctr<strong>in</strong>e <strong>of</strong> self-<strong>posit<strong>in</strong>g</strong>. Space <strong>and</strong> time are now not only formal functions,<br />
but dynamical ones; it is through them that the subject is capable <strong>of</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g itself – <strong>in</strong> the<br />
sense <strong>of</strong> self-affection – the appearance for cognition. In other words, it ―posits‖ this<br />
appearance. From the perspective <strong>of</strong> the KrV this sounds like a dogmatic position. In<br />
what sense could the subject posit a dynamic content <strong>of</strong> space <strong>and</strong> time? Posit<strong>in</strong>g after all<br />
does imply, accord<strong>in</strong>g to BDG, be<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general <strong>and</strong> not an object <strong>of</strong> cognition.<br />
<strong>The</strong> possible solution to this apparently uncritical position is to return to the<br />
concept <strong>of</strong> ―orig<strong>in</strong>al attribution‖ that was discussed earlier. <strong>The</strong>re were two fundamental<br />
elements conta<strong>in</strong>ed under the empirical proposition ―I th<strong>in</strong>k:‖ undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed empirical<br />
<strong>in</strong>tuition <strong>and</strong> the <strong>in</strong>tellectual ―I.‖ And, it was a primordial or orig<strong>in</strong>al act <strong>of</strong> attribution<br />
that first moved the <strong>in</strong>tellectual ―I‖ to recognize that <strong>in</strong>tuition as its own (although neither<br />
as cognition, th<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> itself, nor appearance). With this <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>d, the second part <strong>of</strong> this<br />
first passage beg<strong>in</strong>s to unfold. <strong>The</strong> manifold that is posited by the dynamical function <strong>of</strong><br />
space <strong>and</strong> time is described as the aspectabile which is itself prior to any apprehension.<br />
In this regard, it st<strong>and</strong>s parallel to the undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed empirical <strong>in</strong>tuition from the orig<strong>in</strong>al<br />
attribution. Its description as an appearance prior to apprehension <strong>in</strong>dicates that the<br />
manifold that is now be<strong>in</strong>g posited is spatio-temporal. Thus, <strong>in</strong> a certa<strong>in</strong> sense, Kant is<br />
theoriz<strong>in</strong>g a return to that footnote <strong>in</strong> the ―paralogisms‖ <strong>and</strong> reth<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g that undeterm<strong>in</strong>ed<br />
manifold that was described as the condition for the possibility <strong>of</strong> any act <strong>of</strong> thought.<br />
gedacht wird (<strong>in</strong>tuitus quem sequitur conceptus) <strong>in</strong> welchen das Subject <strong>in</strong> der<br />
collectivern E<strong>in</strong>heit des Mannifaltigen der Anschauung sich selbst setzt.”<br />
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