The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

where the earlier indeterminate empirical intuition belongs. It is as if the logical act
discussed in the first moment of the ―analytic‖ level of the doctrine assumes always
already a relationship between the sensible I (the ―indeterminate empirical intuition‖) and
the intellectual I (thinking). The ―I think,‖ in this account, is the representation of that
first unity out of which it is possible for the subject to be conscious of itself. And, due to
the fact that the intuitive manifold of this ―sensing I‖ is indeterminate – for no modi nor
category are yet at play – the result of this original attribution is a self-consciousness as
an Object, but only to the extent in which it is unified under a single ―I think.‖ From the
perspective of this passage from the KrV – the most similar to the Selbstsetzungslehre –
the ―I think‖ is thus considered as an empirical expression of both the intellectual I and
the sensible I, where the latter is already attributed to the former, but where they are both
still ―in general.‖ The ―I think‖ expresses these analytically.
In so far as the ―I think‖ represents an act and is analyzed propositionally, then the
only content that can be contained analytically within it, is an ―intellectual I‖ that is
nothing but thinking. This is Kant‘s dominant approach or orientation in the KrV and
Descartes critique. On the other hand, from a synthetic or ontological perspective, the ―I
think‖ stands for an ―act of spontaneity‖ out of which the ―passive sensing I,‖ with all of
the indeterminate representations that it is, is attributed in a unity by the ―intellectual I‖ to
the ―intellectual I‖ itself.
From the referenced passage in the KrV together with Baum‘s insights and the
resources thus far provided by the analysis of the Selbstsetzungslehre, there is a first
approximation to what ―führt‖ between the logical and the ontological levels of the
doctrine mean. Moreover, the meaning of the analytic level‘s understanding of
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