The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

exists, which is the cancellation of the condition for the material element of inner
possibility, is the cancellation of possibility itself. The latter is what it means to express
that something is ―unconditionally impossible.‖ The possibility of a Realerklärung for
the ontological proof resides, again, in Kant‘s identification of the material element of
inner possibility.
The generality and key – yet primitive – philosophical function of the concept of
Setzung as it appears in Kant‘s BDG is certain to have made its elucidation thus far
extremely abstract, somewhat repetitive, and fairly entangled. This is perhaps to some
extent unavoidable, as the discursive resources available to work through its meaning
most likely share in the same constraints as the concept itself. However, if nothing else,
it is clear that the concept is in itself of utmost philosophical significance and its
particular character in BDG reveals very specific Kantian concerns and parameters of
investigation. For instance: 1) that in our basic philosophical concern with Sein
überhaupt we distinguish between its position through the copula from its position
through the existent; 2) that in light of the recognition of this difference, a different type
of philosophical account is necessary – a conceptual account that does not itself reduce
the real to mere logical forms of thought or conceptual relationships; 3) that part of any
such Realerklärung consists in thinking of the possibility of something in general as
determined both formally and materially; and 4) that in this way we establish the
conditions for the possibility for legitimate reality and truth claims. It appears as if the
fate of the concept of Setzung as Sein überhaupt may be essential to any measure of
Kant‘s ontological commitments.
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