The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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necessary for possible predicates of determination in BDG or in the Dialectic of KrV). 75 In this case to posit is a kind of activity exercised by the mind over itself. Time functions as a formal subjective condition – or ground – understood as a necessary manner, way, or sensible mode in which representations are given to the subject. Bringing together both time and positing, Kant writes that time is ―the way in which the mind is affected through its own activity, namely this positing [Setzen] of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself.‖ In light of this discussion of time, setzen appears to entail the temporalization of representations given in outer sense and in this way takes part in the capacity for the mind to apprehend and synthetically determine a manifold in inner sense. 76 The relationship of ―what‖ is posited and time brings to light the latter‘s function as ground for the posited representations. Time functions as the form that determines the different qualitative relationships among the given representations in so far as they are posited in the mind by the mind. Its legitimacy as such grounding form resides in the fact that time is shown to be a necessary form of all intuition that precedes a priori any affective content (i.e., determinations of thought, given multiplicities or representations, or unity in self-consciousness, etc.). In its a priority time is completely independent of all experience, and as such pure. 75 KrV, B67-8-9. 76 Sample passages in which the setzen appears are with respect to time in the KrV‘s ―Aesthetic‖ section are: ―[…] the time in which we place [setzen] these representations […] grounds the way in which we place [setzen] them in mind [the] as formal condition‖ (B67); ―[…] in so far as something is posited in the mind‖ (B68) ―I assert that the quality of space and time – in accordance with which, as condition of their existence [!], I posit both of these [bodies and my soul] – lies in my kind of intuition and not in these objects in themselves‖ (B69-70). 54
Just as time functions as the form by which representations can become available to the mind, it is also the case that without the positing of these representations in the form of time, the latter could not itself be represented at all. When considered as form of intuition alone time is pure and thus empty of any proper representational or recognizable content; as such ―it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind,‖ Kant explains. As a condition for the possibility of its representation in self- consciousness, time is the form in which a given multiplicity from outer sense are to be posited and made available to the subject for thought. Simultaneously, time itself becomes perceptible to the subject through the given that is posited or inserted into time. In addition, in the context of setzen there are two instances in which time can be thought of as content: first, when thought of in abstraction from its function as mode of the positing of representations, and second, when it itself is the a priori content of a category of the understanding (the latter case is discussed in the next section). Time in its pure intuitive or sensible form may not be perceptible but it nonetheless has content in the form of pure relations – of succession, simultaneity and persistence. 77 Here the issue is that at the level of pure intuition, there is no recourse to the traditional distinction between form and content, for there are no identifiable sources for either of these determinations within the sphere of pure intuition alone. As the result of the passivity characteristic of the faculty of sensibility, there is no activity proper to it alone to create 77 ―[…] it [time] contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected through its own activity, namely this positing [Setzen] of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form (KrV, B67-8-9). 55
Page 1 and 2:
The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
Page 3 and 4:
Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
Page 7 and 8:
Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
Page 11 and 12:
Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
Page 13 and 14: of receptivity‖ reveals also the
Page 15 and 16: enables thinkers in the twenty firs
Page 17 and 18: form of ―principles of synthesis
Page 19 and 20: a transition that has its own ―sp
Page 21 and 22: the English language literature tha
Page 23 and 24: his account was circular. As Först
Page 25 and 26: fascicle written by Kant between 18
Page 27 and 28: the doctrine of self-positing attem
Page 29 and 30: preemptively with this retrospectiv
Page 31 and 32: meaning of its particular relations
Page 33 and 34: ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
Page 35 and 36: ecause the only operative rule for
Page 37 and 38: In the context of the BDG, the natu
Page 39 and 40: 3. It is unconditionally impossible
Page 41 and 42: . We know that a condition for inne
Page 43 and 44: Realerklährung - an explanation of
Page 45 and 46: ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
Page 47 and 48: Negation can also result from chang
Page 49 and 50: ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
Page 51 and 52: foreclosed. This is precisely what
Page 53 and 54: none of this is particularly new. N
Page 55 and 56: elations of thoroughgoing determina
Page 57 and 58: that exhibits it must share in the
Page 59 and 60: of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63: category causality in the second an
Page 67 and 68: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 69 and 70: points to the fact that in the act
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116:
This connection between the single
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it concerns the possibility of the
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perspective of its relation to the
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apperception and b) the synthetic o
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and the section ―On the Paralogis
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synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128:
on the possibility of attaching the
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distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
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object. 177 The consciousness of my
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doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
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perspective, contained analytically
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an inference: [...] 186 The first s
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this follows from the fact that for
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feeling can be said to be a form of
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that of which we are conscious as o
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true, the nature of intuition concr
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This formulation of the ―I am‖
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Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
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of identity, the analytic containme
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there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
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objectification and ―I am‖ as V
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The first synthetic act of consciou
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introducing a different field of de
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where the earlier indeterminate emp
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What is given first to the power of
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epresentation that was given prior
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outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170:
ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172:
These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
Page 177 and 178:
from which the ―I think‖ gains
Page 179 and 180:
The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196:
Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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187
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