The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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intuition‖ is prior to any categorical determination of it, which means that it has no status as a substance within the cognitive domain. It is also not an appearance, which means that it does not yet concern the modi or manner in which what is given is; space and time are not yet said to be forms of all intuition. Neither is it a noumenon. Instead it concerns what he calls the real, what exists in fact, a kind of given empirical representation. In relation to thinking, this indeterminate empirical intuition is presented as condition for there to be any ―I think‖ at all. However, as empirical intuition, it is clearly not the intellectual ―I.‖ Taking all of these characteristic marks into account, it appears to be what is given to consciousness prior to any self-consciousness, but a condition for its possibility. In other words, it is what must be in place for there to be any ―original attribution‖ at all. Although he provides no direct citation from which his particular interpretation arises, in his essay ―Subjekt und Person bei Kant‖ Baum gives an account of a moment in Kant‘s position that he refers to an ―act of prima occupatio.‖ 218 It designates the first act by which the ―sensing I‖ is attributed or incorporated into the intellectual ―I‖ as belonging to it. According to Baum‘s reading, the process by which this takes place is one of self-affection: the act of attention and attachment by and to the ―I think.‖ From what has been discussed thus far concerning the doctrine of self-positing, it is not entirely clear if or where this first act would belong in the schema. It is equally unclear thus far dadurch nicht sagen will, das Ich in diesem Satze sei empirische Vorstellung; vielmehr ist sie rein intellectuell, weil sie zum Denken überhaupt gehört.‖ 218 Baum, M. ―Subjekt und Person bei Kant,‖ in Transzendenz und Existenz. Idealistische Grundlagen und modern Perspektiven des transzendentalen Gedankens. Wolfgang Janke zum 70. Geburstag, ed. Manfred Baum and Klaus Hammacher. Amnsterdam/Atlanta, GA 2001, 6. 150
where the earlier indeterminate empirical intuition belongs. It is as if the logical act discussed in the first moment of the ―analytic‖ level of the doctrine assumes always already a relationship between the sensible I (the ―indeterminate empirical intuition‖) and the intellectual I (thinking). The ―I think,‖ in this account, is the representation of that first unity out of which it is possible for the subject to be conscious of itself. And, due to the fact that the intuitive manifold of this ―sensing I‖ is indeterminate – for no modi nor category are yet at play – the result of this original attribution is a self-consciousness as an Object, but only to the extent in which it is unified under a single ―I think.‖ From the perspective of this passage from the KrV – the most similar to the Selbstsetzungslehre – the ―I think‖ is thus considered as an empirical expression of both the intellectual I and the sensible I, where the latter is already attributed to the former, but where they are both still ―in general.‖ The ―I think‖ expresses these analytically. In so far as the ―I think‖ represents an act and is analyzed propositionally, then the only content that can be contained analytically within it, is an ―intellectual I‖ that is nothing but thinking. This is Kant‘s dominant approach or orientation in the KrV and Descartes critique. On the other hand, from a synthetic or ontological perspective, the ―I think‖ stands for an ―act of spontaneity‖ out of which the ―passive sensing I,‖ with all of the indeterminate representations that it is, is attributed in a unity by the ―intellectual I‖ to the ―intellectual I‖ itself. From the referenced passage in the KrV together with Baum‘s insights and the resources thus far provided by the analysis of the Selbstsetzungslehre, there is a first approximation to what ―führt‖ between the logical and the ontological levels of the doctrine mean. Moreover, the meaning of the analytic level‘s understanding of 151
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
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it perceives only its effects. In a
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category causality in the second an
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Just as time functions as the form
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spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
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points to the fact that in the act
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latter (as for the other dynamical
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unity is expressed. In the second a
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Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
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idealize what can be claimed to be.
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The structure in the schematic of t
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critical model entails thus the sub
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continuous reiteration of the most
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[machen] of experience with the sou
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and not actuality. 103 These fields
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functions as ground to a universal
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appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
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Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
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thought. While the spirit of the cr
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faculties of representation in ligh
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particularly in their presence, uni
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knower to thin an objective represe
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doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
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to intuition. This status brings to
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Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
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Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125 and 126: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128: on the possibility of attaching the
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
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Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156: objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159: introducing a different field of de
Page 163 and 164: What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166: epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168: outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170: ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172: These passages by no means say the
Page 173 and 174: sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
Page 175 and 176: schematization. What that is like w
Page 177 and 178: from which the ―I think‖ gains
Page 179 and 180: The path taken to arrive at a basic
Page 181 and 182: As seen in chapter four, the relati
Page 183 and 184: In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
Page 185 and 186: MAN that, indeed, no science unders
Page 187 and 188: medical doctors, educators, and phy
Page 189 and 190: the grounding of the human sciences
Page 191 and 192: ______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
Page 193 and 194: S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196: Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
Page 197: 187
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