The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
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<strong>of</strong> identity, the analytic conta<strong>in</strong>ment <strong>of</strong> the ―I am‖ <strong>in</strong> the ―I th<strong>in</strong>k‖ po<strong>in</strong>ts to the necessary<br />
function <strong>of</strong> this ―I‖ as the vehicle <strong>of</strong> all thought, as the copula <strong>of</strong> all possible judgments,<br />
as the unity <strong>of</strong> concepts to their possible characteristic marks, <strong>in</strong> other words, as a Verbum<br />
(the unify<strong>in</strong>g Verbum). Understood as that subject (logical, not substantial) that can never<br />
be predicated <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g else, the ―I‖ is thus noth<strong>in</strong>g other than a logical po<strong>in</strong>t <strong>of</strong><br />
reference common to all representations <strong>in</strong> thought. <strong>The</strong> question now, <strong>in</strong> this section, is<br />
how it is possible to transition between a merely logical level <strong>of</strong> apperception to an<br />
ontological one.<br />
That this transition is an element <strong>in</strong> Kant‘s doctr<strong>in</strong>e is not <strong>in</strong> question. We f<strong>in</strong>d<br />
this idea clearly expressed <strong>in</strong> the follow<strong>in</strong>g passage, for example:<br />
Logical consciousness leads [führt] to the real <strong>and</strong><br />
progresses [schreitet] from apperception to apprehension<br />
<strong>and</strong> its synthesis <strong>of</strong> the manifold. […] <strong>The</strong> whole <strong>of</strong><br />
objects <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuition—the world is only [bloβ] <strong>in</strong> me<br />
(transcendental idealism). 205<br />
In the first <strong>and</strong> last sentences <strong>of</strong> this passage, one f<strong>in</strong>ds Kant emphasiz<strong>in</strong>g the<br />
aforementioned two dist<strong>in</strong>ct levels as well as the idea <strong>of</strong> a transition between them. This<br />
is not the transition that is the characteristically identified problem <strong>of</strong> the Op as a whole<br />
(the transition between metaphysics <strong>of</strong> nature <strong>and</strong> physics), but one between the broader<br />
doma<strong>in</strong>s <strong>of</strong> logic <strong>and</strong> ontology, each describ<strong>in</strong>g a different way the subject posits itself.<br />
As shown <strong>in</strong> ―Chapter One‖ <strong>of</strong> this dissertation, the predom<strong>in</strong>ant mean<strong>in</strong>g <strong>of</strong> the concept<br />
<strong>of</strong> setzen, Setzung, or Positio that runs through Kant‘s pre- <strong>and</strong> critical works has a dual<br />
205 Ak: 22: 96-7. Förster, 195 (translation modified). Orig<strong>in</strong>al: ―Das logische Bewuβtse<strong>in</strong><br />
führt zum Realen und schreitet von der Apperception zur Apperception und deren<br />
synthesis des Mannifaltigen. Ich kann nicht sagen: Ich denke darum ich b<strong>in</strong> sondern<br />
e<strong>in</strong> solches Urtheil (der Apprehencio simplex) wäre tautologische – Das Ganze der<br />
Objecte der Anschauung – die Welt ist blos <strong>in</strong> mir (transcendentalen Idealism).‖<br />
141