The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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posited is twofold: a representation of the form embedded in all representations of outer sense as well as the representation of the manifold of pure relations that constitutes space in its pure a priori form. 81 There is still one more parallel difference between construction and drawing on the one hand and setzen on the other. The first two are said to be the necessary activity to think the circle or the line, respectively. The second is said to be the necessary activity to represent three dimensional space. Within the same paragraph, Kant moreover qualifies the transcendental synthesis of the imagination that is common to all three of these as a ―productive‖ faculty in the sense that in doing this the imagination ―does not find some sort of combination of the manifold‖ already in the form of intuition, but produces it through self-affection. 82 With neither the grounds nor the intention to draw a grand conclusion from what may be a chance choice of words, the contrasts do suggest potential interpretive paths or aspects to consider. For instance, when it comes to the thinking of geometrical figures, for Kant the concept of such a figure and its construction are one and the same (a luxury philosophy does not share). Remembering this, one may find the present delimitation of the use of ―think‖ may not be completely insignificant. The contraposition to represent 81 Here is the full passage being referenced, KrV, B155: We also perceive this [figurative synthesis of the manifold contained in the mere form of intuition] in ourselves. We cannot think of a line without drawing it in thought, we cannot think of a circle without describing [beschreiben] it, we cannot represent the three dimensions of space at all without placing [setzen] three lines perpendicular to each other at the same point […]. Original: ―Wir können uns keine Linie denken, ohne sie in Gedanken zu ziehen, keinen Cirkel denken, ohne ihn zu beschreiben, die drei Abmessungen des Raums gar nicht vorstellen, ohne aus demselben Punkte drei Linien senkrecht auf einander zu setzen […].‖ 82 KrV, B155. 58
points to the fact that in the act of positing what the imagination is bringing forth is, as it were, already there qua form of space. The real difference is that here the imagination ―translates‖ a form of a priori intuition – impossible to determine from within the singular field of intuition alone – into a general form of representation accessible to the conscious mind. Thus, despite what could be perceived as an apparent demotion in the ―productive‖ character of its transcendental synthesis, from a subjectivist point of view, what is posited is equivalent to bringing a representation into the distributive unity of all other representations under the same ―I.‖ Or perhaps, looking back, the concept just means to place, which would support the Cambridge translation as well bring to light that a circle, a line, and a point (of unity of the perpendicular lines) are limitations of space. In other words, they are the appropriate form that any transcendental synthesis of the manifold of a priori space would take due to the latter‘s nature as unbounded and singular whole. The simple synthetic act to posit the point of intersection as opposed to move does indeed give credence to distinguishing between thinking and representing. Clearly, this first attempt at deciphering some unique function of the concept of setzen within the more constructive aspects of KrV has posed more questions than given answers. However, if nothing else, it has also opened up possible interpretative paths and located a not insignificant conceptual space where the verb can function within the system of Kant‘s critical philosophy, which is in the sphere of interaction among: given and a priori intuition, self-affection of the mind, and the possibility and necessity of a pure transcendental synthetic act of the imagination upon the mere forms of intuitions. The latter is at the heart of Kant‘s theoretical project and the verb setzen appears to 59
Page 1 and 2:
The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
Page 3 and 4:
Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
Page 17 and 18: form of ―principles of synthesis
Page 19 and 20: a transition that has its own ―sp
Page 21 and 22: the English language literature tha
Page 23 and 24: his account was circular. As Först
Page 25 and 26: fascicle written by Kant between 18
Page 27 and 28: the doctrine of self-positing attem
Page 29 and 30: preemptively with this retrospectiv
Page 31 and 32: meaning of its particular relations
Page 33 and 34: ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
Page 35 and 36: ecause the only operative rule for
Page 37 and 38: In the context of the BDG, the natu
Page 39 and 40: 3. It is unconditionally impossible
Page 41 and 42: . We know that a condition for inne
Page 43 and 44: Realerklährung - an explanation of
Page 45 and 46: ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
Page 47 and 48: Negation can also result from chang
Page 49 and 50: ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
Page 51 and 52: foreclosed. This is precisely what
Page 53 and 54: none of this is particularly new. N
Page 55 and 56: elations of thoroughgoing determina
Page 57 and 58: that exhibits it must share in the
Page 59 and 60: of this ideal and its final personi
Page 61 and 62: it perceives only its effects. In a
Page 63 and 64: category causality in the second an
Page 65 and 66: Just as time functions as the form
Page 67: spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
Page 71 and 72: latter (as for the other dynamical
Page 73 and 74: unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
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perspective of its relation to the
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apperception and b) the synthetic o
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and the section ―On the Paralogis
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synthetic determination of its intu
Page 127 and 128:
on the possibility of attaching the
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distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132:
object. 177 The consciousness of my
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doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
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perspective, contained analytically
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an inference: [...] 186 The first s
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this follows from the fact that for
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feeling can be said to be a form of
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that of which we are conscious as o
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true, the nature of intuition concr
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This formulation of the ―I am‖
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Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
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of identity, the analytic containme
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there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
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objectification and ―I am‖ as V
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The first synthetic act of consciou
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introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162:
where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164:
What is given first to the power of
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epresentation that was given prior
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outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170:
ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172:
These passages by no means say the
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sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
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schematization. What that is like w
Page 177 and 178:
from which the ―I think‖ gains
Page 179 and 180:
The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
Page 195 and 196:
Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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187
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