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The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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y Descartes description that any time my th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g ceases so does any possibility <strong>of</strong><br />

know<strong>in</strong>g if the ―I‖ exists. <strong>The</strong> recognition is also immediate because the evidence <strong>of</strong> my<br />

th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g, which assumes an ―I‖ to which all awareness is attributed, is one <strong>and</strong> the same<br />

as my awareness <strong>of</strong> this evidence. In other words, this awareness <strong>of</strong> the ―I th<strong>in</strong>k,‖ which<br />

is an awareness <strong>of</strong> all this ―I‖ is conscious, is also the recognition <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g that<br />

belongs to it <strong>and</strong> with which it cannot be parted.<br />

Without enter<strong>in</strong>g the greater debate <strong>of</strong> the success or failure <strong>of</strong> this pro<strong>of</strong> on its<br />

own terms, here is one suggestion as to how this pro<strong>of</strong> may be legitimate. <strong>The</strong> key would<br />

reside <strong>in</strong> the first person character <strong>of</strong> ―I am.‖ Because the result <strong>of</strong> this <strong>in</strong>tuitive<br />

reason<strong>in</strong>g is <strong>in</strong> the first person, there is no need to verify outside itself if it is <strong>in</strong> fact the<br />

case. In other words, that ―I am‖ cannot be falsified <strong>in</strong> light <strong>of</strong> my th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>tuition<br />

<strong>of</strong> ―I am‖ is both evident <strong>and</strong> certa<strong>in</strong>. 198 This first person relation is what would make the<br />

cogito the ideal c<strong>and</strong>idate for arriv<strong>in</strong>g at a necessary truth.<br />

<strong>The</strong> reason for <strong>in</strong>troduc<strong>in</strong>g feel<strong>in</strong>g as a form <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>stantiation <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuition here is to<br />

be able to make the th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g activity through which the pro<strong>of</strong> takes place somewhat<br />

concrete. Appeal<strong>in</strong>g to the absence <strong>of</strong> a referent—the actual movement <strong>of</strong> the body as<br />

one walks—for the possibility <strong>of</strong> assert<strong>in</strong>g the truth <strong>of</strong> these feel<strong>in</strong>gs as conceived here as<br />

thought exemplifies <strong>in</strong> what way one‘s th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong> general is itself self-referential. This<br />

self-referentiality together with the idea that all thought or awareness is possible only as<br />

m<strong>in</strong>e is what allows for the <strong>in</strong>tuition <strong>of</strong> the existence <strong>of</strong> myself. <strong>The</strong>re are no other<br />

representational, conceptual, creative tools at play <strong>in</strong> this form <strong>of</strong> th<strong>in</strong>k<strong>in</strong>g. Once<br />

Descartes takes away the referent <strong>in</strong> his explanation <strong>of</strong> the way <strong>in</strong> which ―I walk‖ can be<br />

198 This is an idea taken from a much more complex argument <strong>in</strong> Bernard Williams‘ ―<strong>The</strong><br />

Certa<strong>in</strong>ty <strong>of</strong> the Cogito.‖ <strong>The</strong> discussion here is not meant to represent that complexity.<br />

134

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