The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
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outside itself, which it can then determ<strong>in</strong>e as objects <strong>of</strong> cognition. Space <strong>and</strong> its content<br />
is now ―capable <strong>of</strong> be<strong>in</strong>g given‖ (dabile) to the subject for its determ<strong>in</strong>ation (cognitio).<br />
iii. c. Material Field <strong>of</strong> Determ<strong>in</strong>ability<br />
<strong>The</strong> subject posits itself by means <strong>of</strong> the imag<strong>in</strong>ation <strong>and</strong> simultaneously <strong>in</strong>serts<br />
itself <strong>in</strong>to the very field <strong>of</strong> determ<strong>in</strong>ability that they open for the subject knower. As<br />
already seen <strong>in</strong> the discussion <strong>of</strong> the subject‘s <strong>posit<strong>in</strong>g</strong> itself through space, with this<br />
particular <strong>in</strong>stance <strong>of</strong> self-affection there arises a tension as to the role that the body plays<br />
as condition for its possibility. Once the subject is recognized as both the genetic orig<strong>in</strong><br />
as well as that which must necessarily have a location <strong>in</strong> that object <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>tuition, the<br />
question <strong>of</strong> the materiality <strong>of</strong> the subject as a source <strong>of</strong> a real limitation <strong>in</strong> that space<br />
arises.<br />
In the Op‘s orig<strong>in</strong>al concern with the possibility <strong>of</strong> giv<strong>in</strong>g a metaphysical<br />
foundation to physics <strong>in</strong> order to secure its status as a science – one whose cognition is<br />
empirical –, Kant turns his philosophical <strong>in</strong>terests towards the material dimension <strong>of</strong><br />
actual experience. As a result, he turns also towards his conception <strong>of</strong> the subject‘s outer<br />
sense as the field <strong>in</strong> which this material <strong>of</strong> cognition ―takes place.‖ This material – a<br />
dynamic field <strong>of</strong> forces – is simultaneously also conceived as physical matter as the<br />
Sache an sich selbst (<strong>of</strong> immediate concern to the physicist). While <strong>in</strong> this dissertation<br />
the complete transition between this early part <strong>of</strong> the project represented <strong>in</strong> the Op <strong>and</strong><br />
the late Selbstsetzungslehre has not been treated <strong>in</strong> itself, it is still possible to <strong>in</strong>fer, from<br />
the content <strong>of</strong> the latter, that Kant returns to the basic elements <strong>of</strong> his transcendental<br />
philosophy <strong>and</strong> as he does this he situates the problematic <strong>of</strong> the material <strong>of</strong> experience <strong>in</strong><br />
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