The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...

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x.‖ 168 Once more, the self-objectification that takes place in these passages entails the taking as an Object of thought that which is the logical identity (―I‖) shared by all representations in so far as they must all be able to be attached to a single ―I think‖. And, in so far as this shared ―I think‖ requires for its possibility a unifying function, or, a ―determining,‖ what is being designated is not only a representation of x (without intuition), but what is being designated through it is also a mere activity (thinking). Self- consciousness understood as a self-objectification is thus the subject's grasping of itself in its involvement as a logical act in the grounding all representations. 169 However, the question still remains regarding what it means for self- consciousness as logical act to be that ―wodurch,‖ or, ―through which‖ the subject makes itself into Object. One possible source of elucidation follows organically from the sense in which self-consciousness can be understood as an act of self-objectification, even if the designated object of thought is both empty and a mere unifying thinking activity; this source of interpretation is to take note of the way in which this self-objectification fits into the description of what in the KrV Kant calls a ―constant circle.‖ 170 This perpetual circle is a sign of the fact that, in abstraction from all empirical content, the thinking subject is only able to think its consciousness of itself through the analysis of the expression ―I think‖ as its object. 171 The latter analysis is furthermore itself conditioned 168 KrV, A346/B404. 169 Hence Kant‘s description of this representation as a ―thinking‖ and not an ―intuiting‖ in the passage quoted above. KrV, B157. 170 KrV, A346/B404. 171 Reich, K. The Completeness of Kant‘s Table of Judgments Trans. Jane Kneller and Michael Losonsky. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1992, 25. Indeed the very purpose of the ―Paralogisms‖ is to provide such an analysis in order to show refute the 116
on the possibility of attaching the representation ―I think‖ to this very expression ―I think.‖ Thus, the resulting perpetual circle which Kant speaks of in the ―Paralogisms‖ reveals that, within the sphere of the understanding alone, the most basic requirement for the logical act of self-consciousness (understood here as described in the previous paragraph, i.e., as a form of self-objectification) is that this self-consciousness be possible (understood here as it was described in the previous section, i.e., as the necessity of the possibility of a synthetic unity of apperception for there to be an analytic identity). It is the latter sense of self-consciousness or apperception that brings forth the extent to which it is that ―wodurch‖ or ―through which‖ this making itself into an object is possible. Thus this image of the back and forth or vicious circle created by the subject knower‘s self consciousness of its involvement in all thinking brings some schematic clarity to what Kant means in the above passage when he writes that self-consciousness, which is a logical act, is that ―through which‖ the subject makes itself object. A second way of elucidating the significance of the ―wodurch‖ is Kant's description of the ―I think‖ as a ―vehicle‖ of all concepts and judgments. 172 This description takes place in the opening of section of Kant's account of the paralogisms in traditional metaphysical arguments. Kant remarks that the reader must find curious that the ―concept‖ or ―judgment‖ of the ―I think‖ does not appear in the table of the categories that were deduced in the ―Analytic‖ section of the ―Doctrine of Elements‖ in the KrV. This is because, even if just as necessary for cognition as the categories of the understanding, it is in fact presupposed by all of them, both analytically (as a priori legitimacy of Rational Metaphysics and the common conflation between apperception and inner experience. 172 KrV, A341/B399; A348/B406. 117
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The Doctrine of Self-positing and R
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Abstract of the Dissertation The Do
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Contents Abbreviations vi Preface v
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Preface The interest in the Opus po
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Acknowledgments I am in the debt of
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Introduction The Selbstsetzungslehr
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of receptivity‖ reveals also the
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enables thinkers in the twenty firs
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form of ―principles of synthesis
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a transition that has its own ―sp
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the English language literature tha
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his account was circular. As Först
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fascicle written by Kant between 18
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the doctrine of self-positing attem
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preemptively with this retrospectiv
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meaning of its particular relations
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ii. a. Ontological Proof In its com
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ecause the only operative rule for
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In the context of the BDG, the natu
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3. It is unconditionally impossible
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. We know that a condition for inne
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Realerklährung - an explanation of
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ii. b. Setzung‘s Function as Posi
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Negation can also result from chang
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ii. Kritik der reinen Vernunft ii.
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foreclosed. This is precisely what
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none of this is particularly new. N
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elations of thoroughgoing determina
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that exhibits it must share in the
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of this ideal and its final personi
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it perceives only its effects. In a
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category causality in the second an
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Just as time functions as the form
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spontaneous nature. Or perhaps it r
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points to the fact that in the act
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latter (as for the other dynamical
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unity is expressed. In the second a
Page 75 and 76: Kant‘s new transcendental idealis
Page 77 and 78: idealize what can be claimed to be.
Page 79 and 80: The structure in the schematic of t
Page 81 and 82: critical model entails thus the sub
Page 83 and 84: continuous reiteration of the most
Page 85 and 86: [machen] of experience with the sou
Page 87 and 88: and not actuality. 103 These fields
Page 89 and 90: functions as ground to a universal
Page 91 and 92: appearance, phenomenon, and noumeno
Page 93 and 94: Handschrift, when he writes: The mi
Page 95 and 96: thought. While the spirit of the cr
Page 97 and 98: faculties of representation in ligh
Page 99 and 100: particularly in their presence, uni
Page 101 and 102: knower to thin an objective represe
Page 103 and 104: doctrine, the name is oftentimes qu
Page 105 and 106: to intuition. This status brings to
Page 107 and 108: Chapter Three: The Analytic Level 1
Page 109 and 110: ―Paralogisms‖ section. 136 Desp
Page 111 and 112: the Selbstsetzungslehre. In this re
Page 113 and 114: Not being able to be thought by the
Page 115 and 116: This connection between the single
Page 117 and 118: it concerns the possibility of the
Page 119 and 120: perspective of its relation to the
Page 121 and 122: apperception and b) the synthetic o
Page 123 and 124: and the section ―On the Paralogis
Page 125: synthetic determination of its intu
Page 129 and 130: distinguished from this ―I‖). 1
Page 131 and 132: object. 177 The consciousness of my
Page 133 and 134: doctrine. One finds, in fact, that
Page 135 and 136: perspective, contained analytically
Page 137 and 138: an inference: [...] 186 The first s
Page 139 and 140: this follows from the fact that for
Page 141 and 142: feeling can be said to be a form of
Page 143 and 144: that of which we are conscious as o
Page 145 and 146: true, the nature of intuition concr
Page 147 and 148: This formulation of the ―I am‖
Page 149 and 150: Chapter Four: The Ontological Level
Page 151 and 152: of identity, the analytic containme
Page 153 and 154: there Kant nevertheless asks: ―An
Page 155 and 156: objectification and ―I am‖ as V
Page 157 and 158: The first synthetic act of consciou
Page 159 and 160: introducing a different field of de
Page 161 and 162: where the earlier indeterminate emp
Page 163 and 164: What is given first to the power of
Page 165 and 166: epresentation that was given prior
Page 167 and 168: outside itself, which it can then d
Page 169 and 170: ground that can accommodate the exp
Page 171 and 172: These passages by no means say the
Page 173 and 174: sensible‖ (as Deleuze would phras
Page 175 and 176: schematization. What that is like w
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from which the ―I think‖ gains
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The path taken to arrive at a basic
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As seen in chapter four, the relati
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In so far as the Selbstsetzungslehr
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MAN that, indeed, no science unders
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medical doctors, educators, and phy
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the grounding of the human sciences
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______ ―Metaphysical Foundations
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S. Harris. Revised Edition. Indiana
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Critique of Pure Reason. Chicago, U
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