The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
The Doctrine of Self-positing and Receptivity in Kant's Late ...
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5. <strong>The</strong> ground for the validity <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner possibility‘s relationship to someth<strong>in</strong>g<br />
Wirkliches lays <strong>in</strong> existence.<br />
a. As said earlier, the fulfillment <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> contradiction <strong>in</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner<br />
possibility requires two elements – formal <strong>and</strong> material.<br />
b. In order to fulfill the formal it is necessary to establish that <strong>in</strong> the material<br />
element <strong>of</strong> <strong>in</strong>ner possibility (predicates or characteristic marks) no<br />
contradictions arise.<br />
c. <strong>The</strong> conceptual content <strong>of</strong> predicates can be made dist<strong>in</strong>ct <strong>and</strong> known<br />
through analysis.<br />
d. Analysis can go ad <strong>in</strong>f<strong>in</strong>itum or reach a concept that has no more content –<br />
there is either no end <strong>in</strong> secur<strong>in</strong>g the complete lack <strong>of</strong> contradiction, or no<br />
content that can be contradicted.<br />
e. This <strong>in</strong>capacity shows that the pr<strong>in</strong>ciple <strong>of</strong> contradiction is unable to<br />
sufficiently establish the <strong>in</strong>ner possibility <strong>of</strong> the logical element alone.<br />
f. All that is left when consider<strong>in</strong>g the Wirkliches <strong>of</strong> that <strong>in</strong>ner possibility is<br />
that through which someth<strong>in</strong>g was given as material element <strong>of</strong> possibility.<br />
In other words, that through which someth<strong>in</strong>g is posited absolutely:<br />
existence or Dase<strong>in</strong>.<br />
g. It follows that the <strong>in</strong>ner possibility <strong>of</strong> someth<strong>in</strong>g actual is grounded <strong>in</strong><br />
someth<strong>in</strong>g else that exists.<br />
h. To serve as a priori ground, the said existence must be shown to be an<br />
―unconditional necessary existence.‖<br />
6. <strong>The</strong>re exists an unconditionally necessary Wesen [be<strong>in</strong>g or entity]:<br />
a. To determ<strong>in</strong>e ―absolute real necessity,‖ it must be shown that there is a<br />
reason why it can absolutely not be the case that an existent th<strong>in</strong>g not be.<br />
i. S<strong>in</strong>ce existence is not a predicate, this cannot be accounted for<br />
through contradiction.<br />
ii. <strong>The</strong> alternative is that the negation <strong>of</strong> all existent th<strong>in</strong>gs elim<strong>in</strong>ates<br />
the datum or material element <strong>of</strong> possibility <strong>and</strong> with it thought<br />
itself.<br />
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